
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
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THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY: AN HISTORICAL CASE STUDY

THESIS

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

AFIT/GSM/LSM/89S-46

THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY: AN HISTORICAL CASE STUDY

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics

of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Systems Management

Donald E. Wussler, Jr., B.S.

Captain, USAF

September 1989

Preface

The purpose of this study was to examine the main US-USSR nuclear arms negotiations that have been completed in the last twenty years, with an emphasis on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Significant differences between the INF Treaty and the two SALT treaties are also detailed. The thesis looks at Soviet and US objectives for the INF negotiations and whether they changed. Finally, it analyzes what the two countries got out of the treaty.

The terms of the INF are a radical departure from previous treaties, and the prospect of more agreements in the future appears likely. The arms control world is an ever changing one, and one that should be watched closely in the future.

I would sincerely thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Craig Brandt. His patience and ability to ask the right questions and keep me moving in the right direction made my job a lot easier.

I would also like to thank my wife Jill for her unwavering support and encouragement during my days and nights in front of the computer.

Donald E. Wussler, Jr.

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to perform a detailed analysis of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations and treaty and compare them with the two Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) negotiations and treaties. The study had the following basic objectives: (1) Describe the SALT and INF negotiation processes and the contents of the SALT I and II and INF treaties. (2) Analyze US and Soviet goals pursued and strategies used during the INF negotiations. (3) Determine which goals were or were not attained by both sides, and ascertain reasons for this. (4) Delineate arms control progress since INF Treaty ratification and current prospects for agreements.

The study found that while the two SALT treaties did impose ceilings on the US and Soviet Union in certain areas of strategic offensive weapons, they by no means curtailed the strategic arms race between the two superpowers. Treaty verification methods, while adequate, were criticized by many in the US as being too lax.

The INF Treaty, however, will eliminate by 1991 all medium range missiles in both countries' inventories, a total of over 2600 missiles. The two countries are forbidden from ever redeploying these type missiles. In

addition, this treaty for the first time allows for on-site inspections of missile launch bases, construction and storage facilities to ensure compliance by both sides.

The US achieved the major goal of ridding Europe of the Soviet SS-20 missile, an accurate, three warhead missile. Only by deploying missiles of its own was the US able to make the USSR realize the seriousness of US resolve to eliminate the SS-20. The US also had the unwavering support of the NATO alliance in achieving this goal. However, with INF gone, the European conventional forces imbalance looms even larger, and the West is fighting to obtain asymmetric conventional forces cuts.

The Soviets achieved their goal of ridding Europe of US Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). However, it paid the price of destroying all its medium range missiles, something they never planned on when they first began opposition to the NATO plan to deploy their own missiles. General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to make this sacrifice to promote peace with the West. His current priority is internal reform, and to achieve this, he needs to be able to divert resources from defense. He needs good relations with the West to do this.

Other areas of arms control are in transition today. Further study of arms control could focus on strategic arms talks (START), short range nuclear forces (SNF) talks or conventional forces negotiations.

THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY: AN HISTORICAL CASE STUDY

I. Introduction

General Issue

United States (US) President Ronald Reagan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. In the spring of 1988 the US Senate ratified the treaty. Within three years of the signing date, the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy all their missiles, nuclear and non-nuclear, with ranges of 500 to 1500 kilometers (24:720).

In the entire history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty is the first instance in which weapons will actually be destroyed. In fact, the destruction has already begun in both countries. The US and the USSR have embarked on the new road towards reducing arms, as opposed to just limiting them.

In addition, the INF Treaty is the first treaty that allows for on-site verification by the two parties. Previously, each side used National Technical Means (NTM),

their own listening devices and reconnaissance that did not cross the border of the other country.

The INF Treaty negotiations were nothing simple to conduct or conclude; the process lasted over six years. However, the treaty has provided the world with new optimism about prospects for further reductions of nuclear arms. In June 1989, after US President Bush's administration took its comprehensive look at all aspects of US foreign policy, the US and USSR resumed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which eventually could lead to a reduction in both countries' strategic nuclear arsenal by as much as 50 per cent. The study of the process that led the superpowers to this watershed agreement can help to ensure that the US's arms control strategy remains on the correct path for its security and the security of the whole world.

Problem Statement

As long as the US and USSR remain the two main superpowers in the world, there will be a need for the two countries to negotiate with each other about nuclear armaments to help ensure peace between them. This process has been happening off and on for the past forty years, practically since the US dropped the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This negotiation process is ever-changing; whether because of changing leadership, new systems development or developments around the world.

It is important for the world to follow these negotiations and to be aware of the evolving nature of them. One way to do this is to examine previously completed negotiations. By studying and learning from past arms negotiations and treaties, it may be possible to use these lessons as a baseline for future progress in arms control between the US and USSR.

This thesis primarily details the process through which the US and the Soviet Union were able to reach their first agreement to destroy some war-making capability while allowing for verification of compliance to that agreement. It looks at two previous nuclear arms treaties, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I Treaty and the SALT II Treaty, in order to ascertain why the INF negotiations and Treaty were and are so different from arms control activities of the past. The thesis also touches on events that have occurred in the nuclear arms control arena since the INF Treaty was signed and ratified. Using all the gathered evidence, it then tries to deduce where the arms control process will move in the future.

In order to address these issues, the following questions are answered:

1) What was the process through which the SALT I, SALT II and INF treaties were reached? How were they different?

2) What is the content of the SALT I, SALT II and INF Treaties? How are they different?

3) What were US and Soviet goals upon entering the INF talks?

4) What strategies did the US and Soviets employ during the negotiations?

5) Did any goals or strategies change during the negotiations? If so, why?

6) Did the US and the USSR attain their goals with the final INF Treaty? If so, why? If not, why not?

7) What nuclear arms control activities have occurred since the INF Treaty signature and ratification?

8) What arms control negotiations are ongoing, and what might be their likely results?

Justification of Research

This study was undertaken to depict the process through which the superpowers were able to take a real first step towards meaningful diminishing of the worldwide nuclear threat. Many detailed books and reports have been written on past negotiations and treaties, but due to the relative recency of INF-related events, this has not occurred for the INF negotiations and treaty. By studying the specific details of past activities and agreements, one can learn what types of arms control has occured, what types seem possible today, and what strategies should or should not be used to secure new agreements that could significantly reduce the chances of nuclear war between the superpowers.

Scope of Research

This thesis attacks the topic primarily in a chronological analysis. First, it reviews the SALT I and SALT II negotiations and treaty contents. Next, the INF process and treaty are investigated in detail. Once the negotiations' summaries are complete, analysis of the three treaties begin. Comparisons and contrasts between the contents are made. The thesis addresses US and Soviet goals pertaining to the treaties, and the degree of goal obtainment is assessed. Finally, the post-INF Treaty events are detailed and analyzed, with a look towards the future of arms control.

This thesis addresses nuclear arms control. The ongoing talks and frequent proposals dealing with possible and actual conventional forces reductions are not addressed. Other treaties in existence, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and others, while mentioned, are not scrutinized in this thesis. Also, this paper does not give a detailed account of the START talks except during the periods in which START and INF were linked. The thrust is towards completed treaties.

Limitations of Research

The primary limitation on this thesis is the lack of data which show firsthand the true Soviet views and goals regarding nuclear arms control. Western sources have tried

to ascertain the truth as to the Soviet mind set, but source data are of course more desirable. Extra caution has been payed when analyzing perceived Soviet views. Corroboration by multiple sources as to these views has been obtained whenever possible.

Another limitation, briefly touched on earlier, is the currency of much of the gathered INF data. Analysis and inferences are based on the most current data available. The thesis has no control over events that have occurred between final curtailment of research and publication.

This thesis contains no classified data. No classified sources were consulted during research. However, this should not be a serious problem, as all terms of the treaties were unclassified. The thesis does not actually discuss detailed capabilities of any weapon possessed by either the US or the Soviet Union, so no performance data, much of which is classified, was required to attain the goals the research.

Background

When President Richard Nixon took office, the nuclear stockpiles of the US and Soviet Union had grown enough that a nuclear war between them could totally destroy both countries. The first SALT talks began in November 1969 and resulted in the 1972 signing of the Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons.

The ABM Treaty limited each side's deployment of ABM sites. The Interim agreement limited the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers each country could have (60:13).

Over the next few years, the two countries started and stopped many times without making concrete progress. In 1974, at Vladivostok, President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev came to a preliminary agreement as to limits covered in the treaty. However, talks stalled again and did not resume permanently until 1977. The SALT II Treaty was signed by Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter in June 1979 (60:14-15).

However, the treaty did not contain some of the limits hoped for by US lawmakers, particularly those in the Senate, whose ratification was required for the treaty to go into effect. Negotiations in the Senate were hard fought, but were preempted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The US put SALT II on hold, and ratification of the treaty never occurred. Each side tacitly followed the terms of SALT II (60:15-23).

Meanwhile, the Soviets had deployed new SS-20 intermediate range nuclear weapons within reach of all Western Europe. In response, NATO decided to deploy US Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles, both medium range systems capable of reaching much of the Soviet Union. Many Europeans, as well as the Soviets, did not approve of this decision, as they were

gravely concerned at the increased likelihood of "limited" nuclear war in their countries. Pressured by the Western Europeans, in November 1981 the US entered INF negotiation with the Soviets, who did not want the US to deploy the GLCMs and Pershing II's (60:24-25).

List of Symbols

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ASM	Air-to-Surface Missile
CIA	Central Intelligene Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
FBS	Forward-Based Systems
FROD	Functionally Related Observable Difference
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
INF	Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutually Balanced Force Reductions
MIRV	Multiple Independently Retargetable Reentry Vehicle
MX	Missile Experimental
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council

NTM	National Technical Means
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surfac-to-Air Missile
SCC	Standing Consultative Committee
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SRINF	Short Range Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
USACDA	United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

II. Methodology

Unfortunately, this subject matter does not lend itself to any real quantifiable analysis. It is not easy to quantify historical events. About the only quantitative result from this process is that the US and USSR will destroy approximately four per cent of the world's nuclear missiles (112:18). Hence, the instrument this thesis uses to answer the research questions is a descriptive historical case study approach.

Emory states " the objective of the descriptive study is to learn the who, what, when, where and how of a topic: (29:69). How does the thesis accomplish this? The major thrust of the effort is an extensive search through, study and review of existing literature. When dealing with arms control prior to the INF negotiations, many books and reports exist on the subject. Also, back issues of national security and foreign affairs periodicals provide much usable information. For INF related events, while books are scarce, the security and foreign affairs periodicals provide a wealth of information. Additionally, newspapers and popular news magazines have been essential in piecing together the actual six year INF negotiation process.

The thesis touches ons post-INF Treaty activities that have (or will have) an effect on further arms control negotiations and treaties. These activities occurred up to

the point of final closure of research. Newspapers and news magazines again provided the bulk of the information.

The actual treaties were available for review. They were of course most helpful in analyzing the differences between the treaties, and the matching of goals with outcomes.

III. Historical Development

SALT I

US Objectives.

Begun in November of 1969, the SALT I talks were approached by the US as a method to "promote US national security by reducing the risk of nuclear war through negotiation of mutual limits on strategic nuclear arms" (60:79). The US had three main objectives in mind as they approached the bargaining table: maintaining equality of strategic force; halting unlimited growth of strategic nuclear weapons and the tensions and expenses that would accompany it, and assuring an adequately verifiable agreement was reached (7:4-13, 60:79).

Pre-Negotiation History.

Preliminary arms limitations proposals predated the beginning of the SALT I talks by almost four years. In 1965, the US proposed to the Soviets a nuclear weapons freeze. At the time, the US possessed 1980 nuclear weapons launchers (854 land based, 496 submarine based, 639 bombers) to the Soviets 431 (224, 107, 100) (110:xxxii). Within this proposal was also a call for on-site verification. Needless to say, the Soviets saw no advantage in freezing weapon development when they would be placed at such a numbers disadvantage. The Soviets were also dead set against on-site verification. According to them, verifications

procedures would interfere with their system of government and would also allow foreign ideas to enter the Soviet society (42:171). Also, the Soviets had fears that the West Germans were about to begin development of nuclear weapons, and they wanted assurances that this would not happen (110:xxxii).

Since 1965, both the US and the USSR had begun movement towards deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) sites. The Soviets deployed a system around Moscow, and in 1967, President Johnson asked for and received authorization to begin deploying a system around Washington. This system was justified to the Soviets as a preventive measure against the Chinese or against accidental launch by the Soviets (110:172). Actually, it was probably a gesture aimed at bringing the Soviets into negotiations. Johnson could see that this increase in defensive posture by both countries would just lead to each country buying more offense to counter the ABMs. What was really needed was a limit on offensive nuclear capability (22:26).

On 1 July 1968, Johnson publicly stated he was ready to meet with the Soviets to negotiate limits on strategic nuclear forces and ABM sites (22:27). Also in July, West Germany agreed to the previously negotiated Non Proliferation Treaty, which allayed the Soviets fears of West German nuclear development (110:xxxii). On 19 August, the Soviets agreed to meetings beginning in September.

However, the next day, the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia, and in protest of this move, the US indefinitely postponed the negotiations (22:27).

Richard Nixon had campaigned to restore US superority in nuclear forces. However, upon taking office in 1969, he realized that the Soviets had enough warheads that regardless of which path the US took towards a buildup, the USSR would have enough power that a nuclear exchange would be devastating to both sides (22:27, 60:13) Hence, he adopted a sufficiency approach to deterrence. He acknowledged the fact that achieving relative parity, as opposed to superiority, would enable the US to fully continue an effective deterrence posture. He also felt the Soviets were willing to talk. They seemed very concerned about deployment of our own ABM system. However, talks would wait almost a full year after Nixon took office while he undertook a major review of all US foreign policy (110:xxxiii).

President Nixon's team of SALT I negotiators was led by the director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA), Gerard Smith. Smith's team consisted of representatives from the State Department, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), USACDA, the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC). The Soviet team was led by Deputy Foreign Minister U. S. Senenov (110:xxxiii).

SALT I Negotiations.

As talks opened on 17 November 1969, the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers were quite different in makeup. The Soviets had relied mainly on large, land based missiles, due to their poor sea access and limited long range bomber experience. Their buildup had occurred rapidly since the Cuban Missile Crisis. They had 1618 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) operational or under construction. By November 1969, they actually possessed more ICBMs than the US, and they were trying to build up their submarine launched force, though they were far behind the US in submarine technology. The US, on the other hand, had pursued a strategy of building a triad of smaller missiles. It possessed 1054 land based ICBMs, 656 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and 600 long range bombers capable of carrying multiple warheads (22:38). The US had stopped building silos in 1967 and had concentrated on a technology that would allow releasing more than one warhead from one missile. Each warhead would also have its own target. This technology, known as MIRV, for multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle, was being tested by the US, but the Soviets had done very little work in this area. President Nixon saw MIRV as a very nice bargaining chip, since he had it and the USSR did not. Also, he believed that MIRVing would be a good counterbalance to the Soviet's ABM sites (42:180).

At the beginning of negotiations, the two sides found they had different definitions for strategic nuclear weapons. The US felt that the strategic covered only missiles capable of being launched from one of the countries and reaching the other. This would include only the long range land, sea and bomber based missiles of the US. The Soviets felt that strategic meant any missile, regardless of its basing location, that could reach the other country. Hence, America's forward based systems in Western Europe, consisting of short and intermediate range ground launched missiles and medium range bombers, would be included. However, the Soviet short and medium range nuclear forces, capable of reaching Europe but not the US would not be included (22:28). Additionally, the USSR wanted compensation for the fact that England and France had nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet soil. It wanted higher limits than the US to make up for the British and French nuclear presence (42:163-164).

When the two sides could not reach agreement as to which offensive weapons should be limited, the Soviets proposed negotiating only the defensive side of the problem. The US demurred, arguing that to not limit offensive weapons would defeat the real purpose of the negotiations. As is the case in many negotiations, the two sides compromised. They agreed to work out a permanent ABM treaty, and to

decide on interim limitations on offensive weapons, which would be made permanent in a future agreement (22:28-9).

The ABM Treaty (Defensive Systems).

The US had originally proposed that each country have the option of building either zero or one ABM site, that site being located around Washington or Moscow. The USSR agreed to the one site proposal. However, the president and congress realized that the prospect of building just the ABM site, around the capital, could turn into political suicide on the home front. It wouldn't look good to US citizens if they thought the government was only out to protect themselves in Washington from a nuclear attack. So, the US had to actually reject its own proposal. Since the USSR had agreed to only build one system, the US tried to get lopsided terms, first four sites to one, then three or two sites to one. The Soviets would not agree, and finally, the two sides agreed that each country could have two ABM sites each (42:161-2).

The ABM Treaty was to have unlimited length. The two countries would review it every five years. It limited each side to the deployment of no more than two ABM installations, each with no more than 100 missile launchers (60:80). Neither side was allowed to deploy ABMs that were submarine launched, mobile, space based or that used laser weapons. Also, rapid reload capability was disallowed as was MIRVing of ABMs (42:162). The ABM site not guarding a

country's capital was required to be at least 1300 kilometers from the capital (110:xxxiv). Neither side was allowed to upgrade any of its Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) to ABM capability. Additionally, any detection radar sites not part of an ABM system had to be located on the country's borders and face out from the country, so as not to appear to protect a specific ABM site (110:137-8).

The Interim Agreement (Offensive Systems).

The interim agreement reached on strategic offensive weapons was to have a length of five years, by which time it was expected a more permanent agreement would be in place. The two sides had problems deciding on equivalent strategic forces since the Soviets' strategic makeup was 70% land based and the US's was only 30% land based. Again, compromise was reached, and the agreement froze the number of covered strategic missile launchers at 1972 levels (42:165-166). The Soviets had some silos under construction, and those were allowed to be finished.

Each side could deploy some more submarine based launchers, but had to dismantle one land based launcher for each submarine launcher deployed. The US had 656 launchers on 41 submarines; they could deploy up to 710 launchers on 44 submarines. The Soviets had 740 launchers; they could increase to no more than 950 (22:33). The SLBMs had no size limit. Older, smaller land launchers could not be remodeled to incorporate newer, heavier ICBMs. In fact, dimensions of

all silos were not allowed to increase by more than ten to fifteen per cent (22:33,285, 42:168).

Exclusions from SALT I.

Obviously, many operational and developmental systems and capabilities were not included in the Interim Agreement. The US traded away its concern about existing Soviet heavy missiles such as the SS-18 for Soviet concessions to not include the US's forward based systems in Europe (110:xxxiv). No agreement was reached on strategic bombers (the US had 600, the Soviets 150), an area that would cause much trouble later in SALT II negotiations (22:33).

Along with these quantitative areas, a few qualitative capabilities were postponed, perhaps indefinitely as it has turned out. The USSR was beginning work on a mobile ICBM; this was not addressed in the agreement. Also, neither side wanted to deal with missile accuracy. The US was leading in that race, so it did not want to trade away this edge. The Soviets, on the other hand, did not want to risk any type of a "freeze" on accuracy, as that would leave them permanently disadvantaged.

Perhaps no other capability has enabled the arms race to accelerate despite, and even because of treaties, more than MIRV. The ability to arm a missile with up to 14 independent warheads has allowed staggering increases in the number of weapons each side can call on. As previously mentioned, President Nixon saw MIRV as a great bargaining

chip, but it was also seen as a great equalizer. The US had stopped building silos in 1967, and had turned to MIRV as a way to gain more power per silo. Many saw MIRV as the way to go in countering Soviet buildup of land and sea based missiles. Similar to what happened with missile accuracy, the US ultimately decided it did not want to lose this technological advantage, as the USSR was at least five years behind on MIRV development.

When the US put MIRV on the bargaining table, it insisted that on-site verification be implemented if there was to be a ban on MIRV development. Of course, the US knew the Soviets would never agree to this. They did not for two reasons, both previously alluded to. They had a natural disdain for on-site verification, and, as in the accuracy case, they did not want to be permanently shut out of the MIRV arena (42:162-163). Hence, the agreement set no limits on MIRV development, testing or deployment. The result was that the number of missile launchers was very much set in concrete; the number of actual warheads was not controlled and, certainly, would be much higher. The US deployed its first MIRVed missiles in 1970; the Soviets, in 1975 (60:81).

Treaty Verification.

The topic of verification of treaty limits has been a major sticking point with almost all agreements with the Soviet Union. Their inherent aversion to allowing outsiders within their borders to witness activities has until

recently prevented any type of on-site verification. However, by the time the SALT I agreement was signed, the US was convinced, as was the USSR, that the capabilities of its satellite, ground radar posts and aerial reconnaissance were good enough that using these methods could detect any breach of the treaty's provisions.

These methods, known as National Technical Means (NTM), are defined as "techniques used to monitor an arms control agreement that do not intrude upon the territory of another state (42:172)". NTM became an issue with regards to the MIRV dilemma. Certain factions, such as the CIA, the State Department and USACDA, believed NTM would work. The President, DoD and the National Security Agency (NSA) believed on-site verification was required. When the Soviets rejected on-site, they proposed allowing MIRV development through flight testing. However, once flight tested, there was little NTM could do to discern whether MIRV had been deployed. This was another factor that led to the dropping of MIRV from the treaty discussions (60:81-82).

The agreement also established a bilateral Standing Consultive Committee (SCC) to deal with alleged violations of the ABM Treaty and Interim agreement. If a country, using NTM, discoverd an apparent breach, this committe would be authorized to investigate the breach and make a ruling as to the charge (42:176).

During President Carter's push to pass SALT II through the Senate, he maintained that Soviet compliance with SALT I was good. Between the signings of the SALT I and SALT II agreements, the US raised eight problems to the SCC. All eight were either shown to be non-violations or were fixed to the US's liking. The major Soviet concern centered on shelters the US had placed over its Minuteman silos. In that configuration, Soviet NTM could not determine whether a silo held a Minuteman II or Minuteman III missile. The US shrunk the the shelters but never did remove them until SALT II banned their usage (22:52-54).

Treaty Signature and Ratification.

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on 26 May 1972. The United States Senate approved the Interim Agreement and ratified the ABM Treaty, both by votes of 88-2 (22:24). However, the Interim Agreement was not passed without some controversy. The compromise freeze the number of launchers at 1972 levels left the Soviets with a quantity advantage of 2350 to 1710. The president and negotiating committee believed that the US more than made up for this difference with missile accuracy, MIRV development, bomber force, and the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France (42:165-166). Some senators did not see it this way. They saw more power for the Soviet Union, and wrote an amendment to the treaty, which passed, that requested the President in the future to

"seek a treaty not limiting the United States to levels of inter-continental forces inferior to those of the USSR (110:29)".

The Department of Defense and the JCS was not overly happy with the agreement either. Again, the problem with numbers was the sticking point. The JCS made sure that MIRV and the new Trident submarine would definitely be developed before they gave the treaty their approval (42:179). Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted assurances that development would proceed on the Trident, the B-1 Bomber, the Washington, DC ABM site and the new Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) (110:xxxvi).

SALT II

Shortly after ratification and approval of the SALT I Treaty and Interim Agreement, SALT II negotiations began in November 1972. The US and USSR approached this set of negotiations under the assumption that any nuclear offensive by either side would result in the "mutually assured destruction" (MAD) of both sides. In other words, neither side could possibly "win" a nuclear war; it would only lose due to nuclear retaliation by the other side (60:15).

US Objectives.

Accordingly, the US wanted to move ahead to reduce the chance that this nuclear war would ever be started. The main US objectives reflected the Nixon Administration's

desire for progress along this line Objectives included ensuring each side had equal ceilings for quantities of launch vehicles, restraining any qualitative advancements that could endanger stability in the future and beginning to reduce the number of launch vehicles on each side. Behind all these objectives was also a goal of ensuring the actual wording of any SALT II Treaty would have much more detail than did the SALT I Interim Agreement. It was felt the IA wording was vague and allowed for too many loopholes through which both sides could continue to build their arsenals (22:30).

Initial Negotiations.

The US's first suggestions to the Soviets called for a treaty that would set the equal ceilings on launchers and have more ceilings dealing with actual capabilities. It also would have prohibited development of systems not included in the treaty, but which would violate the spirit of arms limitation in general. Not surprisingly, the Soviets did not accept these suggestions. Instead, they pushed for maintaining the unequal quantity ceilings that SALT I provided. Also, they resurrected the problem of US Forward Based Systems (FBS), calling for US withdrawal from Europe. Finally, they pushed for preventing the US from developing the B-1 bomber and Trident submarine. They offered no similar curtailments of their own (7:5-13).

The US continued to try to persuade the Soviets to agree to some limits on actual numbers of warheads or payload ceilings. Congress had passed SALT I on the stipulation that equal ceilings be negotiated; also, Congress assumed the US would have a long-lasting monopoly on MIRV technology. However, the Soviets began flight testing MIRVed missiles in 1973, and the specter of the Soviets' heavy ICBMS being MIRVed did not sit well. A few proposals to severely limit Soviet MIRV deployment again fell on deaf ears (7:5-13,15).

The USSR again began to seek compensation for such items as French and British nuclear forces and medium range US bombers in Europe. Additionally, it pushed for withdrawal of US ships close to Soviet waters. The US looked on these capabilities as being vital to relationships with its allies, and did not believe it could offer any concessions. Instead, it preferred to defer these issues to post SALT II negotiations. In a counter movement, the US asked that the Soviets' new Backfire bomber be included in the discussions. While not technically a long range bomber, it did have the range to reach some US targets. The USSR flatly rejected this on the grounds that the Backfire was not a long range bomber (60:16). Over the first two years of negotiating, these types of disagreements prevented any real progress towards an actual SALT II Treaty.

The Vladivostok Accord.

Once again, the time was ripe for compromise and deferment of sticking points. Gerald Ford took office in August 1974 and negotiations resumed in September. This session resulted in a November meeting between Ford and Brezhnev in Vladivostok. At this summit, the two men agreed to attempt to conclude negotiations with a treaty by 1975. This treaty would last for ten years, and would set a ceiling of 2400 strategic launchers for each side. Of these, only 1320 could be MIRVed launchers. Mobile and air launched strategic missiles would be included in the 2400 missile ceiling. Both sides agreed not to construct new ICBM launchers, and to discuss limiting new types of strategic arms. National technical means would again be the verification method used (22:30, 60:16-17).

Each side made a key concession to enhance the negotiating process. The US agreed not to push for cutbacks in existing Soviet heavy ICBMs. The USSR agreed, as they had in SALT I, to drop its call for cutbacks in the US's forward based systems (FBS). The two countries agreed limits in these areas could possibly be subjects for later talks, as could possible reductions in strategic arms. They set a date of no later than 1981 to begin these further negotiations (22:30, 7:5-16).

More Hurdles.

While these bilateral concessions were supposed to allow an agreement to be reached in 1975, negotiations were once again stalled. Two issues, one old and one new, stopped progress in its tracks. The argument over the Backfire bomber again arose; the US wanted to include it under the 2400 launcher limit, but the Soviets refused (22:31).

The new issue was the advent of the American cruise missile. The Vladivostok agreement stated any bomber carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASM) with ranges greater than 600 kilometers would be included as one launcher under the 2400 ceiling. The US interpreted this as to not include cruise missiles. The Soviets interpreted it otherwise. Additionally, the Soviets called for a ban on any ground- or sea-launched cruise missile (GLCM, SLCM) with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. The US saw these two restraints as unacceptably limiting its cruise missile development program (7:5,8-21, 60:17).

These two issues, combined with increasing tensions between the two countries and within the US, resulted in no treaty during the Ford Administration. Ford and Ronald Reagan were involved in a heated battle for the 1976 Republican nomination; Reagan campaigned strongly limits on the cruise missile. Congress was concerned over Soviet compliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement, and hence,

began questioning the merits of the whole SALT process. Ford made a last ditch effort in 1976, proposing to allow cruise missile launchers to be counted in exchange for limitations on the Backfire, but the Soviets refused to link the two subjects, and time ran out before any real negotiation could be done on this proposal (7:5-21).

Negotiations Under Carter.

Jimmy Carter campaigned with pledges to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. He vowed he would cut the defense budget by five to seven billion dollars annually. However, upon his entrance into office, an intelligence committee he appointed brought him some shocking news. This committee was used to give an independent review of intelligence data gathered by the CIA. The committee report gave a much different analysis than past CIA reports had. It concluded that the Soviet Union was no longer living under the MAD assumption. The USSR apparently believed it could fight a nuclear war and win it without sustaining horrendous damage or loss of life. The report also concluded the Soviets were spending much more money on defense than was the US. Subsequent research into this supposed stance has cast great doubt on whether the Soviets actually thought they could win a nuclear war, but in 1977, Carter and his administration believed it. While continuing to push for nuclear limits and reductions, defense spending actually increased in real terms, and much

of this money went in to nuclear development and modernization (44:303-309, 60:19).

Carter had also believed, along with many SALT II opponents in Congress, that the ceilings set in Vladivostok were entirely too high. In March 1977, he offered the Soviets a brand new proposal for SALT II. His "Comprehensive Package" set a strategic launcher cap at 1800, of which only 550 could be MIRVed. He also proposed that the Soviets cut back their SS-18 heavy ICBM force from 308 to 150. He offered no cutbacks in similar US systems, nor did he offer cuts in areas where the US clearly had an advantage, such as strategic bombers or MIRVed SLBMs. The package also called for limits on certain test flights and a ban on development of any new land mobile missiles, including the US's Missile Experimental (MX). Basically, Carter had scrapped Vladivostok (22:30, 60:19-20).

The USSR was not ready to scrap it that easily. It still was prepared to abide by the 1974 agreement, so it flatly rejected the US proposal. Then, the US quickly proposed that the agreement be reached along the lines of Vladivostok, with a deferment of the cruise missile and backfire issues until SALT III. Since the Soviets did not think the Backfire should be an issue, there was nothing there to be deferred. Plus, they definitely wanted to continue efforts to curtail US cruise missile development. Hence, they also rejected this counter-proposal (7:5-22).

Through the ensuing six months, quiet diplomacy was the method used by both sides, and some of Carter's proposals found their way into SALT II, if only in a limited manner. In September 1977, most of the issues had been ironed out, and a format for the SALT II Treaty was also developed. The treaty was outlined in three parts (7:5-23).

Treaty Contents.

Part one was be a treaty through 1985 that reflected a small reduction from the Vladivostok ceilings. The total launcher ceiling was set at 2250 for each side. Of these, only 1320 MIRVed missiles were allowed. Within the MIRV limit, the combination of ICBMs and SLBMs could total no more than 1200. Of these, only 820 could be ICBMs. The Soviet Union was limited to 308 SS-18 heavy ICBMs. Neither side could construct new fixed ICBM launchers, and modifications to old launchers were limited. Each side was could flight test and deploy one new ICBM, and it could have no more than ten warheads on board. Existing land ICBMs were prohibited from being equipped with more warheads, and all SLBMs were limited to 14 warheads apiece. ALCMs were limited to 28 per side, with the US's B-52 ALCM held to 20. The Soviets agreed not to test and deploy its SS-16 mobile launcher, or to produce components for it (60:82-84).

Part two would be a Protocol, lasting until December 1981, dealing with some of the controversial issues of the negotiations. Each side agreed not to flight test or deploy

mobile ICBM launcher. Also, they would not test or deploy any GLCM or SLCM with ranges greater than 375 miles (60:84).

The third part of the agreement would be a Joint Statement of Principles setting guidelines for future negotiations. These negotiations would further reduce the number of strategic launchers, set some qualitative limits for bombers and address the issues discussed in the Protocol (60:84).

Treaty Verification.

Each side would again use National Technical Means (NTM) for verification, and would not interfere with the other side's NTM. Additionally, the two countries would exchange data bases on the systems covered in the treaty. This data base would include information the other side could use to help verify weapons totals. Also, each side would equip its ALCM-carrying aircraft with a visible modification, also called a functionally related observable difference (FROD), so that the other side could ensure the ALCM forces were within treaty limits (88:39). During flight tests of covered systems, the testing country would not encrypt telemetry data that allowed the other side to use NTM to verify the test and the system were within treaty limits (22:34).

US Debate over SALT II.

Between September 1977 and the Treaty signing in June 1979, the details were worked out at the negotiating table.

No major problems arose there, but at home, President Carter faced an uphill battle in gaining approval of the Treaty in Congress. Many saw the Soviets as still having an advantage. Their inventory of 308 heavy ICBMs found no counterpart in the US. While it was pointed out that the US had made a conscious decision not to build heavy ICBMs, some critics wanted the US to state it should have the option to build heavy ICBMs if it chose to (7:3-30, 64:5).

One effective argument in favor of the Treaty was that, given the constraints on certain systems, DoD could more effectively plan to counteract Soviet developments. The Soviets would be limited to certain areas for development, so the US could concentrate on countering these areas. This would theoretically save much money in the development of weapons systems (7:5-27).

Many critics were alarmed at the terms in the Protocol. They saw it as a direct threat against the modernization of the US nuclear forces. It took many promises from the President and supporters in Congress that there were no plans to extend the Protocol terms when it expired in 1981 (64:7-8).

Carter made many other promises to enhance the chances for ratification. He committed to 25 per cent real growth in the defense budget over the ensuing five years. He assured the hawks in Congress he would pursue the Mark 12 warhead for the Minuteman ICBM and the Trident 2 long range

missile. He vowed to pressure the NATO allies to increase their spending on national defense. (43:97-98). He also promised that within the Treaty guidelines he would continue development of the MX missile (60:20).

For every argument in favor of continuing with NTM as the method of verification, there was an argument against using just NTM. Proponents believed that NTM worked well for SALT I. They discounted the possibility of reloading silos as being too difficult to do when the silos themselves are targets. Any missile tested with MIRV capability was counted as a MIRV missile, regardless of how it was armed. Since many tests were required before a missile would be deployed, NTM could verify whether more than one new land ICBM was under development (22:44-49). Additionally, if a treaty was not ratified, then the Soviets would be free to take whatever actions it wished in interfering with the US s NTM capabilities, thereby limiting what information could be gathered.

Critics believed that the Soviets could store many missiles near launchers, to be either reloaded or deployed in the event of treaty cancellation. They also were skeptical that the Soviets would hold to the warheads-per-missile constraints; there would be no way to ascertain how many warheads were on a given missile (22:49-51).

Treaty Signature and "Non-Ratification".

During all this debate in Congress, Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna in June 1979. At this summit, they signed the SALT II Treaty. While there, Brezhnev presented Carter with a letter stating that, while the Backfire was a medium range bomber and the Soviets had no intention of upgrading it, they would limit production to 30 aircraft per year. Carter stated that the US would reserve the option of developing a comparable aircraft (22:35, 88:39).

After much debate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended, by a small margin, that the full Senate ratify the Treaty. Tensions between the two superpowers increased greatly after the signing of the Treaty. US intelligence sources learned that the USSR had stationed in Cuba a brigade of about 3000 men. Actually, the brigade had been there for years (60:20). The fall of the Shah of Iran meant that some of the US's best listening posts for verification purposes were lost (7:5-48). Finally, the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan pushed US tolerance too far. In January 1980, President Carter asked the Senate to indefinitely shelve the final ratification debates. The SALT II Treaty had officially died. It was never ratified (7:5-49, 60:21).

Unofficially, both sides agreed to follow the SALT II guidelines. Both sides have raised issues to the SCC on possible violations of the Treaty guidelines, although

neither side is bound to the terms. Primary US concerns have included Soviet encryption of test data, and the Soviet upgrade of the SS-13 to the SS-25, which the US contends is actually a new ICBM. Since the Soviets designated the SS-24 as their one allowable new land ICBM, the US contends the SS-25 violates the Treaty. USSR concerns include continuing objections to the shelters over Minuteman silos, and more importantly, US decisions to base GLCMs and Pershing II missiles in Europe. They feel these weapons add to the US strategic offensive capabilities, and therefore violates the Treaty. These missiles would come to the forefront of arms negotiations with the INF Treaty (60:96,99).

While both sides vowed to follow the Treaty terms until their expiration in 1985, the US officially did break the terms in 1986, when it deployed a nuclear capable B-52 which drove the number of allowable launchers over the ceiling (88:39).

As President Reagan took office in 1981, Soviet-American relations were at their lowest in recent history. The prospect of further arms negotiations did not seem likely. Reagan had campaigned with promises to significantly build up US military strength, not a stance that welcomed limitations or reductions in nuclear forces.

INF

Soviet INF Deployment.

While the SALT II talks proceeded, both sides continued to build their arsenals in areas not covered by the SALT I treaty. The Soviets were especially busy in building medium range missiles. In 1977 they began deployment of the SS-20, a medium range ballistic missile with three warheads and a range in excess of 3000 miles (60:52). They deployed this missile both west and east of the Ural Mountains, thereby being able to hit both Western Europe and Asian countries such as China and Japan. The SS-20s did not replace any type of missile: the Soviets kept deployed 280 SS-4 and SS-5 single warhead missiles. Meanwhile, the US and NATO had no immediate upgrade to their aging European medium range nuclear arsenal to counteract the SS-20 deployment. They had been concentrating on conventional and tactical nuclear forces for much of the past twenty years. The NATO nations were not pleased with the thought of hundreds of SS-20s within range of their countries (60:22-24)

Both Britain and West Germany had began sounding the SS-20 alarm to NATO and the US soon after Soviet deployment began. They wanted to ensure that the US was still ready to support Europe should the Soviets attack, and they felt upgrade of US nuclear forces in Europe would help to keep the US linked to Europe (6:26). However, the allies took

two years to decide what actions to take to counter the Soviets in Europe.

The Dual Track Decision.

First, the President Carter moved to develop the neutron bomb. Not actually a bomb, the neutron warhead would be attached to the short range Lance missile (75 miles) or eight inch artillery shell (20 miles). These extremely accurate weapons would deliver a high burst of radiation designed to kill people, not destroy buildings. While buildings would be destroyed in a 140 yard radius of the impact point, this would be much less destructive than other equal range missiles (116:29-30).

However, many factions were against this method. The main argument against the warhead was against its purpose. The belief was that since only lives would be lost and building destruction would be minimal, it would be very tempting to use. Many argued that the line between conventional and nuclear arms would grow thinner, and escalation would be inevitable. Many Senators were against it, as were the Dutch and French. The Germans, on whose soil most of these would be stationed, were ambivalent. Privately, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt backed the missile, but publicly he would not for fear of wide disapproval among the German citizens. He also wanted the weapons used as a bargaining chip with the Soviets first. If the US could not negotiate cutbacks on SS-20s or on the Soviets' three-to-one

advantage in tanks, then deployment should occur (116:30, 66:13).

In March 1978, President Carter pressured Schmidt to accept the bomb publicly, or he could not guarantee congressional budget approval for production of the weapons. Schmidt announced Germany would accept the bomb on two conditions. First, the decision had to be made by all of NATO. Second, other NATO countries must accept some neutron weapons on their soil. However, Carter had already decided to postpone the deployment decision. The neutron bomb was not a factor in future NATO decisions (66:13, 3:38).

NATO's planners recommended it should upgrade its longer range nuclear weapons. This would be done for two reasons: to enhance the spectrum of weapons in the NATO inventory and to counteract the Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Europe. By deploying longer range missiles, NATO would be able to hit targets in the Soviet Union from Europe (5:14-15). The weapons that were recommended were US Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. These weapons were already in development and both could be operational by the mid-1980s. The US, Britain and West Germany led the push for NATO to make a final decision (25:42).

NATO did not make their decision quickly. Western European leaders were watching the US Senate fight over the SALT II Treaty. They believed it would be much harder to

sell INF deployment in Europe if the Senate could not ratify the treaty and show the US was actively pushing for peace with the Soviets. While Germany supported INF deployment, it did not want to be alone in deployment. Schmidt announced Germany would accept deployment if at least one other continental European country accepted them also. While the UK had already agreed to British deployment, Schmidt wanted the continent to show its support for the plan and alleviate some pressure on Germany (47:37, 71:25).

The Soviet Union also had its own opinion about the situation. In what was the first volley in what became a four year war to prevent INF deployment, Brezhnev announced that the USSR would cut deployment of SS-20s if NATO cancelled any plans to deploy INFs (47:38). A week later, he said the Soviets would have to take appropriate steps to counter any NATO decision, but that he was removing 20,000 troops and 1000 tanks from East Germany to try to dissuade a deployment decision (100:57). The rhetoric heated up a few weeks later when Brezhnev stated that if NATO even planned to deploy INFs, talks between the US and USSR on INF would be impossible to conduct (59:55, 22:11).

The Soviets' tactics only hardened the resolve of the chief NATO nations to proceed with deployment (62:60). It also appeared to quiet the concerns over SALT II ratification. A NATO summit was planned for mid-December 1979 to try to develop a concrete plan. Before the meeting,

however, the Dutch parliament forbid approval of any NATO deployment plan. Dutch Premier Andries van Agt went to Washington along with representatives of Norway and Denmark to try to convince Carter to delay a decision and move instead to negotiate with the Soviets on INF. Carter said he would like to negotiate, but the decision must not be delayed (59:55).

At the summit, the US and NATO agreed to answer the Soviets' SS-20 deployment. To appease all parties, they developed what came to be known as the "dual track" decision. The two tracks were deployment and negotiation (23:30).

NATO would deploy 572 intermediate range missiles, comprised of 464 GLCMs and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles. Each missile had one warhead. The GLCM was subsonic and had a range of 2500 kilometers. The Pershing was supersonic and had a range of 1800 kilometers. It would replace the non-nuclear Pershing IA. The Pershing II could reach Soviet targets within 20 minutes; the GLCM would take somewhat longer. All the Pershings would be deployed in West Germany. The GLCMs would be spread throughout Western Europe in West Germany, England, Italy, and perhaps Belgium and Holland. Deployment would begin in 1983. For each missile deployed, NATO would retire one older, shorter range nuclear missile currently deployed in Europe (22:110-111, 96:36, 60:22,25, 23:30-31).

Full deployment would not occur, however, if the US could successfully negotiate reductions with the Soviets. While the US would be the sole negotiator with the USSR, it would consult the allies and share the decision making with them. This was the first nuclear arms control negotiations between the superpowers in which NATO would have a significant part. NATO was willing to take delivery of enough missiles to match the Soviets' capabilities. If the USSR cut back on the number of SS-20s in Europe, deployment of GLCMs and Pershings would be decreased also. The deadline for successful negotiations was set at late 1983, when US missiles were scheduled for delivery. There was no suggestion that NATO completely forego deployment of the INFs given successful negotiations. They wanted to replace existing systems as well as obtain Soviet cutbacks (60:25, 96:37-39, 23:31).

Soviet Reaction to Dual Track.

The Soviets were not happy with NATO's dual track. They called the decision a "smokescreen to regain superiority over the Soviet Union" (96:40). They certainly were not going to trade deployed missiles for missiles still on paper and four years away from deployment. Also, they felt NATO had no right to deploy the missiles if in fact the missiles did become operational. However, it soon became apparent that what the Soviets really wanted was to block the deployment of the US missiles (96:40).

However, in July 1980, the NATO stance had not changed but the Soviets wanted to talk. In October, preliminary discussions yielded no results. The US called for equal ceilings on both sides; its Pershing and GLCM deployments should equal the USSR's SS-4, SS-5, and SS 20 deployments. The Soviets now offered to freeze their deployments at existing levels. In return they wanted the United States, England and France to freeze deployment of all forces in Europe capable of reaching Soviet soil. This would include no Pershing and GLCM deployment, freezes on British and French nuclear missiles and nuclear-equipped aircraft of all three countries. The Soviets promised to continue their buildup in Europe if NATO deployed their missiles (22:111, 96:42).

This was unacceptable to NATO for two reasons. First, it would again leave NATO with zero INF and the USSR with more. Second, the US and its allies were determined to not have the British and French nuclear forces included in the INF discussions. These forces were independent of NATO and controlled by those two countries alone. The only missiles that would count would be the Pershings and GLCMs. Once the 1980 US presidential elections were held, these talks broke off (22:111).

The Zero Option.

As with past transitions in power, little progress was made at the beginning of Ronald Reagan's presidency. The

main reason in this case was squabbles within the Reagan Administration. Some question was raised as to the value of the "Euromissiles". Development and deployment was costing billions of dollars; were they worth it? The missiles were redundant; most of their targets were currently covered by US ICBMs or forward based bombers. Also, their survivability was questioned. However, the State Department convinced the administration that if for no other reason, the US in 1979 made a commitment to NATO to deploy these missiles and they should be deployed (96:43-44).

Once the decision to deploy was made inside the administration, arguments arose as to how to negotiate. Reagan was not anxious to negotiate; he did not trust the Soviets and thought they were unreliable. However, he received pressure from the NATO allies. In order to ensure deployment in all countries, negotiations would have to be taken up in earnest (22:112, 30:237).

The US starting position was under much debate within the Defense and State Departments. Some factions wanted to start by allowing some SS-20s in exchange for some US INF deployment. The hawks in the administration saw this stance as leading inevitably to the US trading away INF deployment. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Perle (one of the hawks) was the champion of a proposal to become known as the "Zero Option". Basically, it precluded US deployment of Pershings and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all

Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s worldwide (97:11). This strong opening stance would, he thought, give the US a better chance of an equitable agreement. President Reagan accepted it as his opening bid on the eve of opening rounds of the INF negotiations in November 1981 (6:22-4).

Early Negotiations.

At the talks the Soviets, predictably, did not like the zero option. Aside from them losing all their INF capability, the proposal did not cover submarine-launched missiles, the US's forward based systems in Europe or the British and French nuclear missiles. They called for a moratorium on INF deployment and offered to make large cuts if there was no US INF deployment. They promised to remove many SS-20s while being allowed to redeploy them in the East. The US said no to that on the grounds the Soviets could easily relocate the missiles in the West if tensions heated up (60:25, 22:113).

The Soviets then offered to destroy some SS-20s and all 280 SS-4s and SS-5s. They would freeze the number of SS-20s aimed at Asia. In all they would eliminate more than 572 warheads, the number of US INF warheads to be deployed. All told, they would bring the number of missiles down to the same number Great Britain and France had. Again, the US demurred, stating it would cut its deployment in exchange for Soviet SS-20 cuts, but it would not cancel deployment (60:25-26).

The Soviets, ever persistent to preclude US INF deployment, proposed elimination of all tactical and medium range missiles in Europe, including those of the UK and France. The US rejected and actually wrote a draft treaty along zero option lines. Of course the Soviets did not like it and put forth another proposal not allowing the UK and France to upgrade, not limiting Asian deployment of SS-20s and not allowing US INF deployment. As the first round of talks ended in March 1982, the Soviets announced a unilateral freeze of SS-20s. They also said they would remove some in 1982. However, they warned that if the US INF deployment occurred they would retaliate (22:114-115).

At this point it was clear that the two sides differed in many key areas. The US wanted to eliminate all INFs; the Soviets wanted to keep some of theirs while blocking US deployment. The US wanted to count only US and Soviet missiles; the Soviets wanted to include the UK and French strategic missiles. The US pushed for global limits; the USSR only wanted to talk about missiles deployed in Europe. The US only wanted to talk about missiles; the Soviets wanted to include nuclear capable aircraft (60:26). The US wanted missiles destroyed; the Soviets wanted the option of just withdrawing them. The US wanted the treaty to last forever; the Soviets wanted a 1990 review and renewal clause included (22:114).

The "Walk in the Woods".

Talks resumed in May 1982, and as expected, little progress was made. However, in July, the two sides struck an agreement of sorts. In what has become known as the "Walk in the Woods" agreement, the lead negotiators on both sides, Paul Nitze and Yulin Kvitsinsky, conducted secret negotiations and settled on some non-binding numbers. Each side would be limited to 225 medium range launchers and aircraft. Only 75 could be missile launchers. The US would deploy GLCMs but no Pershings. Hence, the US would have 300 GLCMs (four per launcher) and the Soviets would have 225 SS-20 warheads. The Soviets could keep 90 launchers east of the Urals. All Soviet launchers would be limited to 3 warheads apiece. US GLCM launchers could have four missiles each, with one warhead per missile. Excess missiles would be destroyed. The aircraft covered were the US's F-111 and FB-111, and the Soviets' Backfire, Badger and Blinder. Short range INFs would be frozen (22:115-116, 60:26-27).

There is still disagreement as to how this deal was actually reached. Nitze claims he and Kvitsinsky reached the numbers together in an agreement that would only be binding if both sides accepted. Kvitsinsky says it was all Nitze's idea, and that while he said he would send it to Moscow, he knew it would be rejected. Both sides did reject the agreement. The Soviets were still against any US INF

deployment and the US did not want to limit bombers or do away with the Pershing (22:117).

Negotiations, Deployments and Walkouts.

Negotiations broke until January 1983, but in the interim the Soviets continued their drive to prevent US INF deployment. In December 1982 the Soviets were still only willing to remove some SS-20s for non-deployment of Pershings and GLCMs. This of course was too one-sided for the US (50:20). Before talks resumed the Soviets again offered to dismantle all 280 SS-4s and SS-5s and reduce the number of SS-20s to 162, the number of French and UK missiles. For the first time, the Soviets hinted that they might walk out of the negotiations if the US INF deployment occurred. Again, this was unacceptable. The French and UK missiles were not part of NATO and could not be counted on to defend West Germany. Also, the missiles were inferior to the SS-20 in terms of range and accuracy. Plus, the European missiles had single warheads; the SS-20s had three apiece. The Soviets also did not say whether they would destroy the SS-20s (48:56).

While the INF squabbles were going on, a new set of talks began. In a follow-up to the SALT negotiations, the US and USSR began the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in the summer of 1982. These talks were to take a different course than SALT I or SALT II. As the name indicates, the negotiations would focus on actual reductions

in strategic nuclear arms and not on simply installing ceilings to which the countries could build (32:10). During the next year and a half, the two countries had three separate sets of negotiations ongoing: INF, START and the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, focusing on the conventional postures of the two sides, which had been in session since the mid-seventies without much concrete progress.

As INF talks were set to resume, there were again squabbles in the Reagan Administration. Many felt that while the zero option was a good starting point, it was time to begin bargaining. Nitze felt his hands were tied; how could he negotiate if he had no bargaining latitude. There was a move towards a warhead matching stance in the State Department whereby the US would deploy enough missiles to match the number of warheads the Soviet missiles were carrying (67:16).

The Soviets were still on their "match Europe" drive, and General Secretary Yuri Andropov offered to cut SS-20s lower than 162 if France and the UK cut some of their missiles (47:19). Back in the US furor arose as Reagan fired Eugene Rostow, head of USACDA, and hired Kenneth Adelman. Apparently, Rostow wanted more flexibility in negotiations than Reagan was ready to give. Questions began to rise as to whether Reagan wanted to negotiate a treaty or

really just wanted to deploy his missiles in Europe (57:18-19).

Andropov then revealed a "plan" to reduce all European INF, including French and UK strategic missiles. However, his method of counting equated ancient European weapons such as the British Vulcan bomber and French S-2 and S-3 missiles to the Soviet Backfire and SS-20. He also wanted West German non-nuclear Pershing Is removed. Needless to say, the US rejected the plan, and the two sides still did not see eye to eye as the talks resumed in Geneva (97:18-20).

As the talks began, the US was convinced that reaching no agreement would be better than reaching a bad one. However, Western Europe was moving towards the position that any agreement would be good, especially if it limited SS-20 deployment (97:23). President Reagan was also leaning towards a bit more flexibility in the talks. Nitze stated that the US was no longer "locked in" to the zero option, although that was the best way to ensure peace (40:26).

Finally, in April, Reagan announced the US would negotiate an interim solution on INF, although his ultimate goal was still the zero option. If the Soviets were to significantly reduce their SS-20s, the US would only deploy enough missiles to match the SS-20s warhead for warhead. Reagan also called for reductions in the Soviets' Asian SS-20s. This decision was made in conjunction with the NATO allies, who were pushing for just such flexibility. Vice

President Bush had visited Western Europe, and he found out that most countries were ready for compromise. The Soviets, however, were not ready for a compromise which allowed US INF deployment, did not take aircraft into account and did not count French and UK missiles. They offered no hope of agreement (12:12-14).

In May, Andropov made a new concession. He agreed to reduce the European SS-20s such that their warheads would equal those of France and Great Britain. He also announced that if NATO deployed Pershings and GLCMs, the USSR would deploy SS-20s in East Germany. He also hinted at other countermeasures he might have to take. The Soviets were pulling out all the stops to prevent the deployment (39:28-29, 8:15).

In August, West Germany brought up the "Walk in the Woods" compromise and stated that might be a good agreement to settle on. However, neither the US or USSR wanted to revisit that plan. After that rejection, the Germans did not push the issue (46:28-29). Andropov then promised not just to withdraw but to destroy enough missiles to even the SS-20 with the French and British. Of course, the price was no deployment of Pershings and GLCMs. The proposal fell on deaf ears (69:10).

Andropov delivered a not unexpected ultimatum in November. The Soviets would definitely walk out of the INF negotiations if deployment began. He also stated

preparations had begun in East Germany and Czechoslovakia to deploy new missiles. He also pledged to drop SS-20 levels in Europe to 140 and freeze Asian deployment at 108. Andropov had made his final play to try to scare Western Europe into reneging on deployment. The West did not blink and rejected the terms. NATO also announced that it would retire an additional 1400 shorter range missiles over the next five years (38:70-71).

In mid-November, the first GLCMs arrived in Great Britain. Also, the US announced it would lower its deployment if the Soviets were serious about lowering SS-20s to 140. However, instead of walking out of the talks, the Soviets did a side step. They stated they would really walk out when the first Pershing missiles were delivered to West Germany (84:30-33).

The Soviets had put all the pressure on West Germany. The future viability of the NATO alliance was on their back. Before the Pershings would be deployed, the West German Bundestag had to approve the action. When the vote came out 286 to 226 in favor of deployment, the US deployed the first Pershings (86:12-13).

The Soviets had backed themselves into a corner. There was no way they could continue negotiation if the wanted to. They did indeed walk out of the negotiations. They also announced an end to their unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployments in Europe. They would begin SS-21, SS-22 and

SS-23 deployments in Czechoslovakia. Plus, they would deploy submarines (carrying a new 1500 mile range SLCM) near the US (86:12,16).

In addition to the INF walkout, they walked out of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions (MBFR) talks. At the end of 1983, the two countries had no arms control talks in progress (85:36, 104:25).

The Year of No Talks.

Essentially, 1984 was a dead year on the subject of arms control. One shimmer of hope occurred in March when the Soviets announced they would allow some on-site witnessing of their destruction of chemical weapons (101:11). However, in June, they announced they would begin to add more SS-20s in Europe, over the 243 they then had stationed there. Additionally, they again hinted at possible short range missile deployment in Czechoslovakia and East Germany (45:35).

INF, START and SDI.

Suddenly, in December, the Soviets pulled another about face. They announced that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would talk with US Secretary of State George Shultz to arrange the start of new negotiations. They were willing to talk about many weapons, strategic, intermediate range, and defensive, without the precondition that the US withdraw its missiles. Why the turnaround? NATO's resolve in forging

ahead with deployment had a great deal to do with it. The USSR saw all targeted NATO countries accept their GLCMs, if not without controversy, at least without wavering at their moments of truth. Also, once the missiles were deployed, much of whatever momentum the European peace movement had died. Additionally, the US had just given Reagan another four years in office: if bargaining was going to get done, it would have to be done with him. Finally, their image had been tarnished by walking out of all the talks a year earlier. Their proposal for new talks would help salvage their position within Europe and in the world (1:16-17, 68:3).

The talks were to begin in March 1984. The US had seen some promise in the possibility of somehow merging the INF talks with the START talks. Perhaps with more types of weapons on the same table, bargaining would be easier. The two sides decided to conduct three sets of negotiations, but to conduct them with one group of people with three subgroups covering long range weapons, INF and defensive weapons. Having all subgroups under one leader would was seen as facilitating the bargaining process. One thing the US had decided was that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars, space based defense system, was not to be used as a bargaining chip (15:19, 19:26).

This program had been announced by Reagan in 1983. Its purpose was to provide a space based system that would

protect the US from any massive nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. While SDI was only concepts on the drawing board and years away from even the most rudimentary testing, Reagan did not want to make even the smallest concession that would hinder SDI progress.

Going in to the new Geneva talks, the US position on INF was that it would accept equal ceilings from zero to 572 worldwide. While it preferred zero, it did not expect the Soviets to agree to it, as they already had 280 missiles deployed (26:21).

Moscow's first move showed something old and something new. The old ploy dealt with INF. Gorbachev told the US he would not deploy any more INFs until November if the US would do the same. The new ploy dealt with SDI. He proposed the US freeze development of space defense technology as long as talks were ongoing. The US rejected both offers. Since the Soviets had over 400 INF warheads in place and the US had just over 100, they did not see the moratorium as fair. Also, as noted earlier, no bargaining would be done on SDI (95:12).

This SDI punch and counterpunch was the first of many to be exchanged by the two sides. What actually was beginning was a shift away from the Soviets' emphasis on the US INF deployment and towards SDI as their main concern. However, Moscow was still trying to push for zero US INF and some USSR INF, so the first round of the new INF talks again

went nowhere (27:18). Also, for the next two to three years, INF would be intermittently linked and unlinked to START and SDI.

The Geneva Summit.

In July, the two sides arranged a summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, in Geneva, in November 1985. No real agreements were expected to be reached, but the meeting was seen as an opportunity for the leaders to get to know one another and try to make some progress together (96:38). Much happened between July and November. Gorbachev announced in September that unless the US stopped work on SDI, no agreement could possibly be reached on offensive weapons (17:16). Reagan responded by stating again he would not deal SDI for Soviet missile reductions at Geneva (103:22).

Next, the Soviets asked to conduct joint meetings of the three subgroups. In a overt move to link the offensive talks with the defensive ones, they made a proposal. They proposed large scale strategic missile reductions coupled with a halt on SDI, but did not mention INF. While the reductions were attractive to the US, they rejected the proposal because of the SDI halt (2:13).

Then, they did link INF. They proposed that each side cut by 50 per cent its missiles capable of reaching each other. For the US these would include all its strategic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and many of its shorter range

missiles, including the INFs, SLCMs and ALCMs. The Soviets primarily had just their large land ICBM and smaller SLBM arsenals capable of reaching US soil. Soviet INFs would not fall into this category. Additionally, they called for a ban on all long range cruise missiles and on development of new ICBMs. Finally, they added that SDI would have to stop. The Soviets agreed to talk separately with the UK and France about short range INF missiles in Europe. The US cried foul. First, this would cut the US INF force but not the Soviet one. Second, SDI would be gone. Third, the Soviets would only deal away their INF for British and French reductions (114:26,28-29).

Right before the summit, each side threw one more INF proposal onto the table. The US proposed that the INF ceiling be set at 450 warheads, not counting British and French missiles. The Soviets countered that the US deploy 120 GLCMs and no Pershing IIs and that they would decrease SS-20s to equal the then combined warheads of the US, UK and France. They would also freeze their Asian SS-20 force. Plus, they delinked this proposal from SDI. Before the US could respond, the summit occurred (115:19-20).

At the summit, Reagan and Gorbachev pledged that both sides would accelerate the arms control negotiations. They agreed in principle to reduce arms by 50 per cent. Which arms they did not specify. There was no agreement on SDI;

however, they did agree to negotiate a separate INF agreement not linked to SDI (68:9, 102:23).

Post-Geneva Progress.

Mikhail Gorbachev began 1986 on a grand scale. In a February speech to the 27th Communist Party Congress, he outlined a three part plan to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In part one, lasting five to eight years, all US and Soviet INFs would be removed from Europe, strategic weapons would be reduced 50 per cent, both sides would renounce space weapons and a ban on nuclear testing would be agreed to. Part two would see the end of tactical nuclear weapons and part three would eliminate the rest. For the first time, he also came out in support of on-site verification of all this elimination (10:18, 68:10).

The US, while lauding Gorbachev's lofty goals, saw a few ambiguities in his speech. Would he remove his SS-20s from Europe and put them in Asia? Were the French and British missiles to be counted? Would he object to current plans to modernize the British and French forces? Finally, was the INF removal linked in any way to Star Wars? No answers were readily available from the Kremlin (10:19). Reagan countered with an offer to eliminate INF in three and a half years; 50 per cent in 1987 and the rest in 1990. No Soviet reply was heard (63:51). The Soviets did, however, say there were again no preconditions for an INF deal.

Reagan was for that, as long as demands for inclusion of French and British missiles were dropped (99:52).

Another Summit is Planned.

The process then seemed to move forward. In April, another summit was planned. This one would occur in November 1986, and INF was to be the main topic. Some even thought a treaty was possible (90:38). In July, the two countries exchanged scientific teams equipped with seismic devices for listening to each other's nuclear tests (26:25). Reagan sent a delegation to Moscow in August to begin to work towards the summit and try to iron out INF problems. Not much progress was made, but the two sides agreed to meet again (61:22).

In September the idea of a summit was thrown into complete doubt. The US arrested a Soviet United Nations employee, Gennadi Zakharov, for spying. In response, the Soviets detained US News and World Report reporter Nicholas Daniloff. While the US Congress and parts of the Cabinet clamored for President Reagan to call off talks and plans for the summit, Reagan thought otherwise. He wanted a summit and was willing to continue to negotiate with the Soviets while trying to secure the freedom of Daniloff (13:26). In the end, Zakharov was expelled, and Daniloff was freed by the Soviets. The summit was still alive.

Gorbachev again stated in October that an INF agreement could be reached without bringing SDI into the picture. He

proposed a European ceiling of 100 warheads per side. The US agreed but pushed for an Asian ceiling of 100 as well. The Soviets agreed to some limit but would not be tied down to a figure. The Western Europeans were satisfied with a ceiling of 100, as they did not really want to get rid of all INFs. They had fought hard to get them on their own soil and did not want to lose them now. The Soviets had seemingly dropped demands for counting British and French missiles and even intimated they might not object to British and French modernization. On-site verification requirements had not yet been agreed to, and some in the US thought that US desires would be stringent enough to kill the whole INF deal (21:19-20).

The Reykjavik Summit.

As usual, Gorbachev had a few surprises ready. Reagan had hoped for a full blown ceremonial summit, perhaps in Washington. However, in October, Gorbachev proposed that the two just conduct a "mini-summit" in Reykjavik, Iceland, where they could get personally involved in the arms control process. Gorbachev also hinted he might push for two additional years compliance with the SALT II Treaty in exchange for an INF deal (13:26). Reagan agreed to the Reykjavik summit, and the two met for two days in October.

Gorbachev's real surprise was yet to come. He offered again to lower strategic arms by 50 per cent. He also changed the INF deal: he proposed no INFs in Europe and a

ceiling of 100 in Asia, with the US keeping 100 somewhere in the US. Then came the stunner. The whole deal, including the INF portion, was as linked to SDI. The US must promise not to develop, test or deploy SDI capabilities for ten years. An Gorbachev was not budging on this. Reagan did not budge either. He flat out rejected this deal, and the Reykjavik summit ended seemingly a disaster (41:20, 51:39).

Post-Reykjavik Tensions.

The post-Reykjavik reactions were mixed. Many in Congress felt Reagan had gone too far without bargaining on SDI. However, opinion polls in the US showed that Gorbachev was held to blame for the Reykjavik breakdown by a three to one margin. Also, most of the US's allies were in favor of Reagan not backing down (11:25). A week later, Gorbachev repeated that his Reykjavik offers were still open (9:21). Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze met for two days in November on a salvage mission, but no progress was made and each side blamed the other (89:d1).

The situation got worse before it got better. The US said it was still trying to work an INF deal and a 50 per cent strategic reduction. The USSR felt the US was backing down from a statement Reagan made at Reykjavik supporting a move to eliminate nuclear weapons in ten years. In a US clarification, the US position was a desire for no nuclear weapons but no elimination would occur without drastic conventional reductions. The NATO allies were glad to hear

this, as they felt the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe without conventional reductions would leave them open to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression (89:61).

Next, the US officially and overtly violated the terms of the SALT II treaty. By deploying its 131st B-52 equipped with ALCMs and not dismantling a Poseidon submarine, they went over the limit on strategic launchers. In no time, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced it would have to shore up its arsenal (70:43)

The Relationship Thaws.

Just as US-Soviet relations seemed headed for coldness reminiscent of 1984, the thaw began again. In January 1987 there were hints that the Soviets wanted to negotiate again and may be willing to compromise on SDI (14:17). Talks resumed. Then in March, Gorbachev made an offer. If the US removed all its INFs from Europe, the Soviets would, too. No strings were attached. INF talks which were to go on hiatus in March were continued, and Shultz went to Moscow to talk with Schevardnadze. The Soviet plan would take five years to accomplish and would still allow for 100 missiles in Asia and 100 in the US (91:38).

In March, the US presented its verification proposal for an INF treaty. It included visits to sites to witness missile destruction, observance of missile dismantling, a permanent observation post where the 100 missiles would be kept, observers on the perimeter of production plants checks

of shipments in and out and short notice inspections if credibility problems arose (30:633, 56:14). It was not known if the Soviets would accept this, although the US negotiators saw little problem with American compliance to it. However, in a speech in April, Gorbachev said he would demand verification and inspection "everywhere" (18:21).

The "Double Zero".

The next hindrance that arose was some shorter range missiles, those with ranges of 300 to 600 miles. One criticism levied on the proposed treaty as it stood was that when the long range INFS (600-3400 miles range) were gone, the Soviets would be ahead in Europe in short range INFs (SRINF) by 500 warheads to zero (91:39). Along with their verification proposal, the US team began hinting they would push for some linkage of these short range weapons (56:14). In fact, in April, they did link the two. Shultz proposed that the Soviets freeze their SRINFs and allow the US to build up to equal strength. Gorbachev quickly responded that he would remove all his SRINFs within one year of US Senate ratification of a treaty if the US pledged not to build any. Shultz demurred until talking with the President and the allies. Gorbachev even proposed a nuclear free Europe, but Shultz rejected that (18:21-22). West Germany was the key. It was the target of most of the Soviet SRINFs. When Chancellor Helmut Kohl backed

elimination of all longer range and shorter range INFs, the US agreed in principle to this "Double Zero" proposal (82:33).

Clearing the Final Hurdles.

There were still fears in the US that Gorbachev would again link an INF agreement to SDI. His popularity was on the increase; Reagan was having domestic troubles, especially regarding the Iran-Contra affair. On the surface, Reagan needed a summit and agreement worse than did Gorbachev (51:30). Would Gorbachev use this to his advantage? In July, Moscow let it be known that they were looking to tie "an INF deal to a framework agreement that spells out key provisions on deep reductions of strategi- arms and bans testing/deployment of SDI in space" (51:30).

Also, the US was still pushing for a global removal of INFs. The Soviets wanted to keep their 100 missiles in Asia. In June, they also called for the US to remove 72 Pershing 1A missiles from West Germany. Technically, the missiles belonged to Germany, but the nuclear warheads belonged to the US. The Pershing 1A range put it into the SRINF category. The US felt removal of these weapons would strain its relationship with West Germany, and the two countries had plans to upgrade them to short range Pershing II's so the US rejected this proposal. (111:18, 51:30).

In August, Gorbachev linked the two issues. He would agree to a global zero if the US removed the 72 Pershing

1A s from Germany. He also said that just leaving the 1A's in and not upgrading them was not an acceptable option. He also voiced dismay over an announced US plan to redeploy its GLCMs to ships. The US backed off from this plan and agreed to destroy all the GLCMs, but still insisted the Pershing 1A's were German and should not be counted (111:18, 58:14). The Germans announced in September that they would retire all 72 Pershing 1A's when the US and USSR fully complied with the terms of any INF agreement. This move satisfied all parties, and the two sides were now very close to final terms on the INF Treaty (36:12-13).

The few problems with the verification methods were also closed up in September in a rather surprising way. The US backed down on the requirement for a short 24-hour notice inspections at missile sites and factories. The FBI, CIA and some allies were very concerned of what the Soviets might see that they should not if they took advantage of the short notice inspections (36:13).

Treaty Signature.

In late September, Schevardnadze visited Washington to hammer out the last few details. He and Shultz announced the treaty would be ready to sign at a summit in the US in by the end of autumn (16:14). In working out the kinks, the Soviets wanted the Pershing 1A's written into the treaty, but the US said that it was a unilateral act by Germany, not to be covered in a US-USSR treaty. When asked what the US

would do with the warheads. Shultz said they would be taken apart like the warheads in the treaty. This satisfied Schevardnadze, and he dropped the request for Pershing 1A inclusion (36:14-16). The hurdles were all cleared, or so it seemed.

Shultz visited Moscow one last time to finalize summit details in late October, and Gorbachev told him that the signing of the INF Treaty was not reason enough to hold a summit. He wanted to talk about Star Wars. When Schevardnadze had last visited the US, he had brought new Soviet concessions on certain types of space testing, and Gorbachev wanted to push for an SDI deal. He saw that Congress was pushing for some SDI limitations, and he believed Reagan was very anxious to have a summit. He even offered to lower the land ICBM subceiling currently being discussed in the START negotiations (49:56-57).

Gorbachev's gamble backfired. Reagan again stated he would not link INF and SDI. Around the world the outcry against Gorbachev's ploy was loud and clear. The following week, Gorbachev proposed an early December summit in US to sign the INF Treaty. Reagan accepted, and on 8 December, the two men signed the INF Treaty (55:50-51, 87:17).

Treaty Contents.

The terms of the INF Treaty are very simple to understand. All missiles with ranges of 621 to 3418 miles would be destroyed in three years. All missiles with ranges

of 311 to 621 miles would be destroyed in 18 months. The treaty bans flight testing of any missiles within these ranges. Neither country can produce stages or launchers for these missiles (75:A4).

Each country must notify the other as to when and where they will eliminate its missiles. Within 30 days of ratification, each side could inspect all missile locations and related installations to confirm all the missile data the two sides had already exchanged. Each country can witness missile destruction and inspect the sites afterward (75:A4).

The treaty allows short notice inspections at various agreed to locations for thirteen years. During the first three years, 20 inspections per year are allowed. After that the number drops to 15 per year for the next five years and ten per year for the last five years of the verification agreement. Neither side will interfere with the other's National Technical Means (75:A4).

Treaty Ratification.

Now all that remained was for the US Senate to ratify the treaty. Three separate Senate committees, Foreign Relations, Armed Forces, and Intelligence, reviewed the treaty before the full Senate had a chance to debate it (54:31). While ratification was never much in doubt, there was great fear that certain Senators might try and succeed in attaching amendments to the treaty that would require

renegotiation with the Soviets. One Senator, Jesse Helms of North Carolina, was dead set against the treaty and would go to great lengths to try to block ratification. He simply did not trust the Soviets to honor the terms of the treaty.

First he argued that the warheads would not actually be destroyed. He was rebuffed on the point that the US had actually insisted on this condition to protect against possible shortages of nuclear material and to prevent the Soviets from having access to US technology in this field (54:31).

He next had help from Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota. He tried to float an amendment that would require the Soviets to reduce their conventional forces in Europe to levels equal to US deployment before the Senate could ratify the treaty. Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the JCS, argued against this, saying the treaty was "sufficient, verifiable and had no impact on NATO's fundamental strategy (54:1).

In early April, the US and USSR set a date in late May for Reagan to visit the Soviet Union (20:18). Reagan expressed hopes that he would have a ratified treaty to bring with him to Moscow (105:A15). However, there was a long road to travel before ratification would become a reality.

While reviewing the treaty, the Armed Services Committee became concerned that, while the it banned existing nuclear and non-nuclear missiles, nothing was said

of bans on any type of futuristic missiles using lasers or other technology. While Reagan contended they were implicitly banned and Moscow agreed, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, head of the Committee, stated an amendment to the treaty might be required. Of course, Reagan did not agree (34:A6, 74:A10, 105:A15).

Another battle began brewing with the introduction of the Biden amendment. Named after Senator Joe Biden of Maryland, this amendment dealt with interpretation of the treaty. Many Democratic Senators believed President Reagan had been using a liberal interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty with the SDI program. The Senators did not want Reagan or any other president reinterpreting the INF Treaty without Senate consultation or approval (34:A6).

Verification problems also cropped up as ratification neared. An argument arose over certain Soviet storage containers. These containers, while not big enough to store a whole SS-20, could store certain stages of the missile. The US argued the USSR gave it the right to look in these containers back in December before signature. The Soviets now disputed this point (33:A1). Also, conflict started over which buildings the US could inspect. Each site was put on maps, with boundary lines drawn. The US wanted to be able to inspect any building within the boundary lines. The Soviets wanted the US in only certain marked buildings. There was also a dispute as to whether the US could use

cameras within the boundaries for verification purposes (35:A1).

Meanwhile, all three committees did recommend full Senate ratification, given the problems were resolved. Senator Majority Leader Robert Byrd announced full Senate debate would begin on 9 May, and that President Reagan's trip to Moscow was not to be thought of as a deadline for ratification (4:A7). A Soviet letter to Washington the weekend before scheduled debate was termed ambiguous and not enough to answer Senate concerns. Additionally, the letter surprisingly called for the US to destroy 21 Pershing 1As stored in the US belonging to Germany (35:A1).

When on 9 May these problems had not been resolved, Byrd postponed the debate. In a move to show firm US commitment to ensuring a fair agreement, the White House agreed that it was important to clear up these problems. Reagan sent Shultz to Geneva to speak with Scheverdnadze and try to reach agreement on the verification problems and the new Pershing 1A issues (35:A1).

Within two days, the two had solved the problems. On the futuristic missiles concern, both sides again agreed that the treaty banned any and all missiles with ranges of 300 to 3000 miles. On all the other points of Senate contention, the Soviets relented. The US could look in the smaller containers, it could inspect all buildings within agreed to boundary lines and it could use cameras in

verification. The Soviets also backed down on the Pershing 1A when the US agreed to tell them how many were stored and where they were located (35:A1,A8). National Security Advisor Colin Powell and Shultz briefed Senate leaders, and Byrd announced debate would begin on 16 May (80:A1, 73:A9).

Once debate began, supporters of the treaty had to fend off many amendments. They voted down a Helms amendment stating Gorbachev was not the rightful signatory of the USSR because did not hold the title of President (73:A15). Republican Senator Steve Symms of Idaho wanted to delay ratification until Reagan could prove the Soviets had complied with the last five arms control agreements. This amendment was voted down also (77:3). A provision to ban production of rocket stages compatible with Soviet INFs was rejected. A Helms amendment calling for Reagan to certify the actual number of SS-20s the Soviets claimed to have was turned down (72:A1,A13).

Senate leadership was becoming exasperated. Before the President could have a ratified treaty, the Senate had to finish debate and amendments to the actual treaty, then draft its resolution on the treaty. They had not gotten off the actual treaty yet. By 24 May, Helms was the remaining hinderer. In a move to stop him, Senators Byrd and Dole filed a petition to invoke cloture. This would allow amendments to be proposed until noon on 25 May. Then a vote for cloture, requiring 60 votes, would occur. If the

cloture resolution passed, further debate on the treaty would last no more than 30 hours (76:A1,A14). Helms surrendered the next day, promising not to stand in the way of ratification (72:A1).

The Senate did vote in favor of the interpretation amendment, 72-27, although it would not require renegotiation (81:A5). The president would have to consult with and receive Senate approval to reinterpret the treaty. To appease Helms, another addition would require the president to consult with the Senate and NATO before any other agreements were signed or before he agreed with a Soviet leader on a framework for any future negotiations (79:A1, 75:A4).

On 27 May 1988, the US Senate ratified the INF Treaty by a vote of 93 to 5. President Reagan had already left for the Moscow summit, but White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker was waiting in Washington to pick up the treaty. By the time Reagan reached the Soviet Union, he was carrying the first ratified arms control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union in sixteen years (75:A1,A4).

IV. ANALYSIS

INF and SALT: A Comparison

The Negotiation Process.

Any negotiation process, when examined, will reveal many iterations of proposals and counterproposals, compromises and hard line stances. These three sets of talks were no different. However, the talks did have some differences between them that are worth mentioning.

When the US began SALT I talks in 1969 it was looking just to ensure basic strategic parity. In 1972, the US again wanted parity under SALT II, but was also looking to cut back on each side's launch vehicles. By 1981, Ronald Reagan wanted to deal for total elimination of one class of missile.

The verification stances of the US also changed through the years. While all the US could realistically push for in both SALT negotiations was NTM due to Soviet desires, the INF talks saw the first real push and realization of on-site verification.

The opening postures of the US were also quite different. In SALT, the US was starting with a relatively equal level of strategic weapons as the Soviets. As the INF talks began, the Soviets had been deploying SS-20s for four years, but the US was still two years away from deploying its first GLCM or Pershing II! Yet the US actually tried to

deal with the missiles they did not have, as if they were bargaining chips to be played later.

Weapon systems or capabilities perceived as possible bargaining chips were present in all the negotiations. In SALT I, the Soviets were beginning to develop a mobile ICBM, while the US was testing MIRV capability. During SALT II, the Soviets had the heavy SS-18, and the US had the ALCM. These developments perhaps could have been traded for concessions and reductions by the other side. However, the side with the capability did not want to give it up totally, and the side without it did not want to agree to a freeze that would lock it out of developing the system altogether. Hence, neither side wanted to deal, and the systems were deferred to future negotiations. In the MIRV case, the failure to control this capability in 1972 was a main contribution to the huge buildup of warheads in the 1970s. The Soviets did develop the technology, and the US continued to replace single warhead missiles with MIRVed ones.

During the INF negotiations, the US played both ways with bargaining chips. Once the deployment began, the Euromissiles became a bargaining chip that the US was actually willing to trade for Soviet concessions. However, many people looked at SDI as a bargaining chip, but when Reagan had his prime chance to use it that way at Reykjavik, he surprised many people by not conceding any of his Star Wars program to secure an INF deal. In both cases, the US

make the right move. Reagan got the deal he wanted by using the Pershings and GLCMs but not relenting on SDI.

Another difference that has been mentioned was the involvement of NATO in the INF talks. Never before in nuclear arms control had the US been required, to such a high degree, to consult and seek approval from other countries. In the long run, this actually helped. This does not mean that the SALT negotiations would have turned out differently had the US been as tied to NATO.

The Treaties.

The treaty contents have been described in detail in chapter three. The main differences to be pointed out are rather straightforward and significant. SALT allowed for growth in the class of missiles negotiated; INF resulted in the destruction of the class of missiles negotiated. Approximately four per cent of the world's nuclear missiles will be destroyed under the INF Treaty. The SALT treaties were of limited duration; the INF Treaty is permanent. The SALT treaties allow for verification by National Technical Means. The INF Treaty allows for use of NTM but also contains a detailed plan that is being followed for on-site verification by both sides.

Goals

US Goals.

Between NATO's December 1979 dual track decision and the beginning of INF negotiations in November 1981, US INF goals were evolved somewhat. With the dual track decision, NATO decided to deploy INF for two reasons. First, the existence of medium range missiles would provide another level of employment in its flexible response strategy and would inherently commit the US to getting involved should a European war break out. The Europeans were more than a bit worried that US commitment might not be high in this event, and the INF deployment decision itself showed them the US was committed (5:12). Second, NATO saw the INF deployment as a necessary countermove to the Soviets' deployment of the three warhead SS-20 medium range missile in its western regions. The SS-20 clearly put the medium range inventories in an imbalance, giving the Soviets an overwhelming advantage in terms of numbers and capabilities (6:23).

At this point, the US's (and NATO's) goals were to deploy INF throughout Western Europe by 1983 and at the same time negotiate with the Soviets for reductions in their SS-20 deployments. NATO was willing to forego complete deployment in exchange for these SS-20 cuts. No word was mentioned during the December 1979 NATO summit about the possibility of a zero option. NATO would deploy missiles; the number would be 572 unless US negotiations with the

Soviets yielded a non-zero number less than that (36:37-40, 30:238).

By the time negotiations began, it was clear that the US and NATO believed that the second reason for deployment was the one they would exploit in negotiations. The very existence of Reagan's zero option meant that the first argument was untenable. If INF was truly needed to plug a hole in NATO's European war fighting spectrum, how could Reagan put forth and NATO hail a proposal to not deploy any INF if the Soviets dismantled their SS-20s!

Areas besides warfighting capability had their effect on this decision. Even though it never caused the toppling of a pro-US government in Europe, the "peacenik" attitude of many Europeans did have its effect on government decisions. One of the prime reasons for pursuing the negotiation track of the dual track decision was that the European leaders did not feel they could get approval for INF deployment in their countries if they were not also pursuing ways to limit these very arms (30:237).

The upgrading of NATO's INF also brought home to the people of Europe the increased likelihood and damage associated with a European war. Now that both sides would have nuclear weapons with ranges of up to 3400 miles, it seemed easier to imagine a war in Europe. These new missiles based on their soil would themselves become prime targets of the Soviet missiles. Before, the only the French

had land based long range missiles. Now, the Pershings and GLCMs would be in five countries throughout Europe. Any proposal to eliminate them, especially if this elimination meant they would never be deployed, looked like a good deal. Hence the zero option proposal was welcomed and hailed by most Western observers (6:26-27).

Through the course of the negotiations, the goal of zero INF worldwide did change a bit. For a while in 1981, the US stated it would accept non-zero limits in an interim agreement on INF but that zero was still its ultimate goal. This was just really a move to get the then stalled talks going (12:14).

Also, the US's position on the Asian SS-20s moved in and out of the zero option goal. Up until four months before the treaty was signed, the US was resigned to accept 100 SS-20's in Asia, but they managed to convince the Soviets to dismantle those also (111:18).

Reagan stated his goal of a world wide elimination of INF in 1981. Between then and treaty ratification, he was forced to make some concessions to that would have compromised that goal. However, he never abandoned the goal, and as has been shown in chapter three, the final INF agreement did indeed yield a total ban on intermediate range nuclear missiles.

From the start of negotiations, the US advocated advancements in verification techniques. Reagan and his

aides were proponents of on-site inspection. It took the US negotiating team nearly five years, but in March 1986 it finally completed its draft proposal for treaty verification and presented it to the Soviets (30:241). By then, Gorbachev had already accepted in principle the idea (68:10). The US maintained this goal throughout the term of negotiations and with Soviet concurrence was able to attain a comprehensive agreement for verification.

Did the US achieve all its goals with the INF Treaty? Through the treaty, the US brought about the elimination of all the Soviets' medium range missiles. This was a goal set in 1979 with the dual track decision and reiterated with President Reagan's zero option. The zero option was indeed realized. The agreement contains by far the most comprehensive verification guidelines ever incorporated into a treaty between the superpowers. This too was something the US wanted from the beginning of the negotiations.

One area seems to have been forgotten, however. When the dual track decision was made, half the reason for it was to bring to Europe a middle ground in NATO's warfighting spectrum of weapons in support of flexible response (5:12). Now, the missiles will not be in Europe to provide this piece of the puzzle. In the absence of these weapons, which could perhaps hold the Soviet conventional forces at bay for fear of usage, a land battle in Europe might be won by the

side with the most forces. This is clearly the Soviet Union.

The imbalance in conventional forces has existed for a very long time, longer, in fact, than the SS-20s have been around. However, it appears more important today that the US do something to achieve some sort of parity in forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. The NATO military community and the DoD were both in favor of the INF Treaty and insist that they can still perform their basic mission in Europe, but they are very much in favor of negotiations on conventional forces that would result in asymmetrical cuts resulting in this parity. Only time will tell whether an agreement of this type will be reached. In the meantime, defense posturing will have to be done with a large disadvantage in troops and no INF to back them up (113:716, 31:59).

Soviet Goals.

From the time of the dual track decision, it was never too mysterious that the prime Soviet goal was to secure the elimination of US medium range missiles from European soil while maintaining an INF force of their own. As NATO was beginning to coalesce on dual track, the USSR began alternately rattling sabers and making proposals. This process would continue until INF deployment in late 1983.

For four years they made proposal after proposal, volunteering to cut back the number of SS-20s in their

inventory if NATO would not deploy INF. They obviously failed in achieving this goal, and for two reasons. First they overestimated the anti-nuclear sentiment in Western Europe. They counted on mass protests, which occurred, and the toppling of pro-US governments, which did not (6:27-29).

Second, and related to the first, they underestimated the combined resolve of NATO to deploy. When in November 1983 they announced they would walk out of talks if the deployment occurred, it was their last chance at driving apart the allies. If one country saw the end of talks as too detrimental, it might not accept the missiles. However, NATO held fast and deployment began, the Soviets walked out of the talks, realizing they had failed in obtaining their primary goal (38:70, 68:3). For two more years the Soviets made proposals that would leave the US without INF and the Soviets with INF, but once the NATO deployment began there was never any thought that NATO would agree to a deal like that.

Accordingly, Soviet goals changed after the walkout. The US had recently announced the beginning of the SDI program, and the Soviets saw this as a system that they did not want to have to counter. The costs would be tremendous. If the US could field even a partial space shield, combined with its existing capabilities, the US would achieve vast superiority in warfighting capability. The Soviets see SDI as just entirely too destabilizing (68:5-6, 94:15).

As a result of Soviet opinions about SDI, they found a new goal: obtain SDI concessions from the US in exchange for an INF deal. SDI was already causing major problems in the START talks. Here, too, the USSR was looking for US limits on the program to secure a deal on long range missiles. So, they applied the same logic to INF. No progress was made for a year on INF because of SDI. At the Geneva summit in November 1985, Gorbachev agreed to pursue an INF deal de-linked from SDI, apparently to have something to make progress on (102:33, 2:13).

However, that was not the end to SDI-INF linkage. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev tried again. When Reagan would not budge on SDI, INF got nowhere for six months until Gorbachev gave up and agreed to an unlinked INF deal close to the zero option proposal. The Soviets' wish for a NATO free of Pershing IIs and GLCMs was too strong to delay any further (41:20, 91:38).

Why had the Soviets failed to meet another one of their goals in the INF negotiations? One reason was the intransigence of Ronald Reagan. At Reykjavik Reagan had a chance to secure a deal for no INF in Europe if he agreed not to develop SDI. He did not give in (52:28, 41:30). To the last day of his presidency in fact, Reagan made no concessions on SDI.

NATO again played a part in stopping the Soviets from getting SDI concessions. More than one NATO leader backed

Reagan on his SDI plan, and most US allies approved of the actions Reagan took at Reykjavik (11:25).

In the end, the Soviets did achieve part of their major goal: the Pershing IIs and GLCMs will leave Europe. However, the cost was a lot more than they had hoped it would in 1979. Instead of paring back deployment in Europe, they will lose 1752 missiles in Europe and Asia.

Strategies

US Strategies.

The US used a very daring overall strategy to start the INF negotiations, and they were ultimately very successful with it. That strategy was the zero option plan, as proposed by Reagan on the eve of the first round of talks in NOvember 1981. Given that the Soviets had been deploying SS-20s for almost four years and the US was still at least two years away from its first INF deployment, the proposal seemed almost outrageous. The Soviets wanted to talk about nuclear capable aircraft in Europe and also about British and French nuclear weapons. Reagan was having none of that. He wanted a straight swap: US INF for USSR INF, no more, no less. To think the Soviets would abandon deployed weapons in exchange for weapons still being tested seemed naive at the time (22:113-114, 60:25-26).

Reagan and the allies held strong on this point, however and not surprisingly, talks went nowhere for quite

some time. The Soviets simply were not willing to make this trade and continued making proposals through 1985 which allowed them some missiles and allowed the US none.

The question of negotiating aircraft was never really a major point. However, the French and UK missiles was a stumbling block for a long time. The Soviets believed that since these missiles were stationed in Europe and could reach Soviet soil they should be included in any deal. In many of their proposals they would have reduced their deployment of missiles to equal French and UK totals in exchange for non-deployment of NATO INF. The US simply rejected every proposal of this type (48:56, 59:23). Not until Gorbachev started to link INF to SDI did the Soviets move away from French and British missile inclusion. For the US, the strategy paid off; in the end, the British and French missiles are not a part of the INF Treaty.

The US did compromise a little on the zero option plan. Reagan realized after a few years of limited progress how tough it was to negotiate when his side of the table had no concessions to give. When talks resumed a year after the Soviet walkout, Reagan stated he would accept equal ceilings of INF anywhere from zero to 572 (the number of GLCMs and Pershing IIs to be deployed), although he preferred zero (26:21). Eventually, as chapter three showed, zero was the number settled on.

Also, the US was willing to compromise for a while on the Asian SS-20s. Europe was the primary area of concern, and the US was willing to allow 100 missiles in Asia. In fact, this condition was in drafts of the treaty up until the very end (21:19, 91:38). The US made a last attempt at getting the Asian missiles dismantled and Gorbachev agreed. Gorbachev tied the Asian zero to some aging Pershing 1A's in Germany, and the US felt the trade was worth it to make the deal and ensure a global zero (31:30, 111:18).

In terms of verification, the US also took a very hard line and maintained it throughout the negotiations. As mentioned, by the time the US presented its verification proposal in 1986, Gorbachev had already agreed to the concept of on-site verification. At that time, he had not committed to any particulars. The US was pressing for witnessing of missile destruction and follow-on random inspections at sites previously used for production, storage and deployment of the missiles in question (30:341). For the next year, the Soviets were rather noncommittal on the verification issue, still agreeing only to the concept but not the details. The US did not waver any in its determination to achieve rigid guidelines. In April 1987 Gorbachev announced he would insist on verification and inspections at least as rigid as the US proposal, as if he had thought up the idea (18:21). The US actually successfully backed down on the number of locations to be

included in the short notice inspections agreement, so as to protect some sites from Soviet scrutiny (36:13).

When verification problems arose during the Senate's ratification process, the US again took a hard line and stayed with it. Through this tactic they obtained Soviet concessions dealing with which missile stage containers could be searched, which buildings could be inspected and the use of cameras for verification purposes (36:A8).

All through the negotiations, whether on NATO INF deployment, SDI or verification issues, the US basically stuck with its original proposal and waited for the Soviets to come around to that position. Minor concessions were made to ease along the negotiation process, but in the end, these concessions were usually given back by the Soviets. In the case of the INF negotiations and treaty, Ronald Reagan's commitment to obtaining true and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms without giving away too much paid off.

Soviet Strategies.

As NATO was reaching its dual track decision, the Soviets were beginning to form the hard line stance they felt necessary to attain their goal of preventing NATO INF while maintaining an INF inventory of their own. Their posturing took alternate courses of announcing no talks could be possible if NATO pursued dual track or stating they would be willing to give up some of their SS-20s in exchange

for no NATO deployment. They did not allow the possibility of NATO missiles make any progress at the table. This stance of course led to little progress in the first rounds of talks.

As the time drew near for NATO to begin INF deployment, the Soviets used a threatened walkout as a strategy to obtain US concessions. They felt that they could portray American resolve as pure stubbornness and that the Soviets would be seen as wanting to talk but being unable due to the US. Public reaction to a possible walkout might force the US to make the concessions necessary to keep the talks alive. Those concessions might have included a delay in INF deployment, which is really what the Soviets hoped to accomplish by the walkout threat (38:70, 48:56).

When the Pershings arrived in December 1983, the Soviets had little choice. They could not stand to lose face by remaining at the talks, so they did in fact walk out. However, the public clamor over their action did not occur. While NATO wanted to continue talks, it was in a much stronger position to wait out the Soviets. NATO had just passed a major test of solidarity by proceeding with the deployment and the decision had brought the alliance closer together. The US waited while it continued INF deployment all through 1984 (80:16).

The Soviet gamble had backfired, and the onus was clearly on them to get the process started again. By the

end of 1984, they realized that NATO was presenting a unified front, any peace movement in Europe that might have helped their cause was gone, and Ronald Reagan would be President for four more years. They announced in December that they were willing to resume the INF negotiations, as well as the START and MBFR talks, which they had also walked out of a year earlier. The walkout strategy was a complete failure (1:16-17).

From 1979 through the end of negotiations, every act Moscow took to try to drive the US and NATO apart only strengthened the alliance's resolve to stick together and proceed as planned. When Brezhnev began the initial warnings that he would "take necessary extra steps" (100:57) should NATO approve INF deployment, this move just made the going easier for Europe to approve a deployment countering the Soviet threat (100:57, 62:60).

One ploy they consistently used to bring about a split was to try to bring the British and French missiles into the negotiations. A few of their offers in 1983 would have had them lowering their missile total to be about equal to the number of missiles the French and British had deployed. It did not matter to them that these missiles were not MIRVed and were much older and less capable than the SS-20 (47:19).

If the Soviets could make this proposal seem as if both sides would have equal capabilities in Europe, the Europeans might pressure the US to make a deal of this type.


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
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Otherwise, negotiations might never accomplish anything, the Soviets would continue SS-20 deployment, the US would begin INF deployment and NATO would be literally covered with missiles. However, Europe, and especially Britain and France, were not fooled. There really never was any chance of either country or the US allowing the French and British missiles into the talks. Finally, in early 1986, Gorbachev stated that the Soviets could live with these missiles not being negotiable under the INF umbrella (136:18, 47:71).

Using the French and British missiles was not the only way the Soviets tried to drive a wedge between the US and NATO. When they threatened their walkout in 1983, Andropov also announced that they would cancel their self-imposed moratorium on SS-20 deployment in Europe. Additionally, they would begin deploying different types of missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia capable of hitting most European targets. Again, they were trying to scare the people of Europe into forcing their governments to push for a delay in the INF deployment. This tactic failed too. The European governments did not budge and deployment began (38:70, 86:16).

While the reign of Gorbachev eventually brought new life to the Soviets' negotiating posture, he was not averse to using some shady tactics. The prime example is the Reykjavik summit. He knew Reagan was anxious to complete basic terms for an INF agreement unlinked to any other

end of 1984, they realized that NATO was presenting a unified front, any peace movement in Europe that might have helped their cause was gone, and Ronald Reagan would be President for four more years. They announced in December that they were willing to resume the INF negotiations, as well as the START and MBFR talks, which they had also walked out of a year earlier. The walkout strategy was a complete failure (1:16-17).

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If the Soviets could make this proposal seem as if both sides would have equal capabilities in Europe, the Europeans might pressure the US to make a deal of this type.

issues. In fact, Gorbachev had said a two weeks earlier that this was possible. Then at Reykjavik he relinked INF to concessions on SDI or there would be no deal. He felt he could not lose. If Reagan accepted the deal, the USSR would get its SDI concessions. If Reagan did not, he would be seen as the bad guy. Gorbachev would appear as the flexible negotiator offering a wonderful deal. When Reagan did not accept the deal and the post-summit fall-out fell mostly against the Soviets, Gorbachev was forced to unlink INF again and he did so in early 1987.

The Soviets' basic strategy towards verification was basically nonexistent until Gorbachev took power. Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, the two sides were never close enough to an agreement on the arms that they could really talk about verification of that agreement. Gorbachev first announced willingness have some verification in early 1986, and from then on the Soviets gradually moved towards the US position on the subject. When problems arose over verification in the US during the ratification talks, Gorbachev apparently did not see the Senators' concerns as show stoppers and he quickly complied with US wishes on the few topics in question (35:A8). Until early 1987 when Gorbachev agreed to the vigorous verification proposals of the US, there was great concern in the West that over verification. Given the negative reactions of the Soviets to past attempts (SALT I,II) to broaden the scope of

verification, on-site inspection was thought of as possibly a treaty killer (21:30). However, times have changed, and so has the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Other Factors

Soviet Leadership.

The period over which the INF negotiations occurred was one in which the Soviet Union underwent a great amount of change. While Chernenko was not in power long enough to have a major affect on the proceedings, Brezhnev, Andropov and Gorbachev each left their own mark on the negotiations. Brezhnev and Andropov both were hardliners, believing the West had no right to deploy any missiles.

Brezhnev was fresh off a period that saw a remarkable Soviet buildup of nuclear arms, achieving at least parity with the US. He was in a very strong position. He could afford to be this brash. He, and Andropov after him, readily made proposals that would favor the Soviets and leave the West with nothing. Andropov was not afraid to rattle sabers, as he did by threatening the walkout and promising further deployments of SS-20s and other missiles should NATO deploy. He was also not afraid to actually walk out of all talks when his bluff was called. Andropov was the last of the Cold Warriors to have a major effect on the treaty.

When Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, there were some initial tensions between him and the US. The first round of talks under Gorbachev went nowhere. However, Gorbachev was beginning to be seen as a modern man, a pragmatist, a man that might deal fairly. During the next set of INF talks the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit was scheduled. The beginning of Gorbachev's reign also gave the world two Russian words to ponder: perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness).

With perestroika, Gorbachev was trying to get his country's economy moving again. Harvests were poor, food lines were long, machinery did not work: basically, the system was not working. Glasnost would actually emphasize telling the truth, owning up to failures and granting freedoms unheard of since Lenin brought socialism to the Soviet Union. The jury is, of course, still out as to whether Gorbachev can achieve his many goals. These two policies did, however, have a seemingly important effect on the INF negotiations.

Gorbachev, being the pragmatist that he is, saw that devoting ever increasing sums of money to defense would be most detrimental to his economic reforms. The money was needed elsewhere. Still, defense had to be maintained. The way to assure less was needed for defense was to secure better relations with his potential enemies, the US and

NATO. Arms control was a great way to do just that (91:33, 94:15).

The case of verification seems to be directly related to the new Soviet openness. For decades there was little, if any, intrusion by foreigners on Soviet soil. By 1987, Gorbachev was insisting that on-site verification be included in the INF treaty. It is hardly likely that on-site verification would have been accepted this readily by any leader prior to Gorbachev.

The personal relationship between Gorbachev and Reagan had a positive affect on the INF process. In three years, the two met five times. Not since World War II had US and Soviet leaders been together that frequently. Granted, though not all the meetings were termed successes at the time, this type of contact between leaders can only help to provide a solid base on which the two sides can work together to build future cooperation.

The NATO Alliance.

There is little doubt that the US would not have been as successful in negotiations had it not been for the strength of NATO. Every time the alliance was tested on INF between 1979 and 1988, it passed. When the dual track decision was being formulated, NATO was recovering from a small fiasco over the neutron bomb. West Germany was balking at accepting the weapon if no one else on the continent would. No one else on the continent was ready to

step up and join the Germans. Jimmy Carter delayed the bomb's production indefinitely. Another failure like that could have seriously hurt the alliance's chances of presenting a strong stand on INF.

Fortunately, the countries were able to work together. When Germany again expressed a desire to not be the only country deploying missiles, Britain and Italy agreed to deploy missiles. When Brezhnev began warning NATO against this plan, NATO hung tough and made the decision anyway. To ensure support back home, the countries agreed that negotiations should also be pursued by the US. While a few countries pushed for a delay of the deployment plan, the negotiation track appeased them and the dual track decision was announced.

The next big test came in 1983 when deployment was about to begin. When Britain took the first GLCMs, the Soviets announced they would walk out of the talks if Germany accepted the first Pershings. NATO's cohesion depended on one vote in the West German Bundestag. The vote passed and the Pershings arrived.

The NATO countries were willing to compromise with each other too. When talks were not going well in late 1982, there was some thought as to whether the "Walk in the Woods" deal should have been taken. Some viewed the US as being too stubborn. A trip by Vice President Bush resulted in the US agreeing to accept an interim agreement on INF totals

higher than double zero in order to keep the alliance happy and try to bring the Soviets into line on the talks. While this interim agreement never occurred, it demonstrated just one more instance where the allies were able to work together towards a common goal.

As previously mentioned, the Soviet pressure to bring the UK and French missiles into the talks was flatly rejected by all countries every time the Soviets brought it up. The resolve NATO showed indicated the countries willingness to risk no progress in the short run if it would result in a favorable final agreement.

One final instance where the US required allied backing came when Gorbachev proposed removal of all short range INF (300-600 miles) from Europe. This decision had a direct bearing on West Germany, as most SRINF were deployed there. They could hit points in Eastern Europe from West German soil, and served, like the LRINF, as a deterrent against aggression. The US was in favor of the proposal, but needed Chancellor Kohl's approval. He did not hesitate in providing just that, and another class of missiles were eliminated.

This was the first set of nuclear arms negotiations in which the NATO allies had a fundamental concern. Strategic talks of the past dealt with missiles not on their soil and for the most part, not targeted for their soil. Naturally, the INF question was different. Because of this great

concern on the part of the allies, the dual track decision mandated that the US would consult with them and solicit their approval for the moves it made in the negotiation.

This stipulation ended up being a large asset for the US. When Reagan took office, there was internal squabbling as to whether to even develop and deploy the GLCMs and Pershings. The cost was questioned, their value was questioned. They were seen as redundant, since most of their targets were already covered by strategic weapons. However, the Reagan went along with dual track due to the commitment made by the US in 1979 to its allies to deploy INF if negotiations failed (96:44). Reagan showed the US's good faith to the alliance by following through on his predecessor's promise.

All major moves the US made were coordinated with the allies, so instead of presenting one country's wishes at the table, the US was presenting over a dozen countries' wishes. All efforts by the Soviets to break up this unanimity failed. NATO passed the test every time one was given.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Reaching arms control agreements is a complicated process which takes a lot of talent, a lot of hard work and sometimes, a little luck. The INF Treaty negotiation process was no exception. The two sides worked (together and against each other) for over seven years to reach a formally ratified agreement. The negotiations took place under one US President and four Soviet General Secretaries. It was only under the last one, Mikhail Gorbachev, that any real progress towards the final treaty was allowed to occur. For this, Ronald Reagan was lucky. Had another cold warrior succeeded Chernenko, there still might not be an INF Treaty.

The United States achieved many goals through the treaty, though not all of them were intentional. The US and NATO succeeded in removing the Soviet SS-20 threat from Europe, a problem they wanted solved since 1977 when SS-20 deployment began. They also deployed their own missiles in Europe in 1983 when negotiations were in a stranglehold: this was a goal set in 1979 with the dual track decision.

The US also reached an agreement that has the most comprehensive verification plan ever implemented in nuclear arms control treaty. After the many criticisms of verification by NTM alone under the SALT treaties, this

treaty allows for little complaint about the verification scheme.

Along the way, the US found a new meaning for the term "negotiating from strength". When Ronald Reagan took office, he promised to build the defense arsenal so that in future negotiations with the Soviets, he would have the strength of that arsenal to fall back on. Indeed, once the Pershings and GLCMs began arriving in Europe, his promise was made good on negotiating from strength on INF. Soviet fears of the Pershing, which could reach targets in the USSR in minutes, did have an affect on them.

However, strength does not always mean numbers of weapons in one's arsenal. In the case of the INF negotiations, strength could be equally defined as the number of nations on one's side. Time and again, from 1979 until ratification in 1988, the strength of the NATO alliance allowed NATO to make and carry through on major decisions. From the dual track decision to support of zero option; from acceptance of Pershings and GLCMs to accepting the double zero option; NATO and the US were solidly in line each time. Every time a major milestone would approach, doomsayers would predict trouble. The Soviets did all they could to dissuade the Europeans from supporting the dual track and from accepting the missiles. The Soviets were relatively confident they could drive a major wedge between

Europe and the US. In a surprise to them and many others, NATO won every time.

The Soviets also achieved some major goals, although they paid a high price for them. They did manage to get the Pershing IIs and GLCMs off European soil. This was a well-known goal, set in 1979 when NATO was reaching the dual track decision. However, it is obvious that in 1979, they did not envision having to destroy all their medium range missiles to reach this goal. Due to the stubbornness of Reagan and the unity of NATO, the Soviets had no other options if they wished to be out from under NATO's INF.

Two other goals the Soviets did not achieve. Their repeated moves to split the US from NATO failed miserably. They underestimated the strength of the leaders and overestimated the fears of the European citizens. Whenever bully tactics were employed, they backfired, giving the western leaders more power to implement decisions.

The Soviets also did not receive any concessions on SDI. Not even the offer Gorbachev made at Reykjavik could coax Reagan from his hard line stance. This issue is not finished, however. Between the START talks and the US Congress, SDI has no easy road in front of it.

The INF Treaty was not a total victory for the US, however. As leaders change, so do priorities, and Mikhail Gorbachev apparently has different priorities than his predecessors. He realizes that if he is to last as leader,

his primary successes must occur inside the Soviet Union. Regardless of his foreign policy moves, the internal structure of the USSR is in need of fixing. To accomplish this, he must ensure his relations with the West are good, thereby lessening the need for piles and piles of weapons. If he can divert funds from defense to perestroika, it will help him remain at the helm of the Soviet Union.

Additionally, the US still does face a severe imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, something INF deployment was undertaken to counter. While talks are underway to address this imbalance, there is no guarantee that they will result in an agreement that aids the US in overcoming the problem.

Recommendations for Future Study

Arms control is alive and well under President Bush. While his administration took a full three months to conduct a comprehensive review of the current status of US foreign policy, negotiations have resumed, and progress should be tracked and reported. Talks of all types are currently underway between the US, the Soviet Union and other nations. Each of these areas of arms control should be worthy of future study. Of course, it is easy to analyze negotiations that have concluded, due to the lack of speculation required as to what strategies are yet to be used or what the terms

of any agreements might be. With that in mind, though, the following negotiations are ongoing.

START.

The START negotiations have been in session off and on since 1984. The overall goal of these talks is to reach an agreement that will make considerable cuts in the US and USSR strategic arsenals. The first session under Bush recently concluded, with no major breakthroughs. The current ceilings being discussed are 9000 warheads per side with no more than 1600 launchers (93:32-33). There are currently four major points of contention.

As with the INF talks, the US SDI program is a hurdle. The Soviets want the US an extension to the ABM Treaty - which would disallow SDI testing in space - before a START agreement is reached. The Soviets seem a little less concerned about SDI recently, however; they believe that time and the US Congress may make this problem go away (107:40-41, 93:35).

There is also disagreement on mobile missiles. The Soviets currently have SS-24s, with ten warheads, and SS-25s, with one, deployed. The US has no mobile missiles deployed. The US would like to see mobile missiles banned for two reasons. First, this would save the US a lot of money and force the Soviets to waste a lot. Also, verification of any set number of mobile ICBMs would be

nearly impossible. However, the Soviets are not ready to give up their mobile missiles (106:39).

One system the US does not want infringements on is the cruise missile. The US has the edge in technology and numbers, and does not want to give up the edge. Additionally, the US feels that cruise missiles are too hard to count, since they are easily hidden. Plus, not all cruise missiles are nuclear and there is no easy way to tell the difference (92:16, 93:35).

Finally, verification is again a problem, but not quite the same problem. This time, the Soviets are insisting on more verification than the US. The Soviets want to inspect far more types of sites, such as manufacturing plants. Additionally, they would want to inspect submarines armed with cruise missiles. The US is dead set against this: they would want any submarine totals taken on faith. The Soviets are not that trusting (106:38,93:35).

Short Range Nuclear Forces (SNF).

After the missiles under the INF Treaty are gone, there will still be many shorter range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the INF negotiations, when Gorbachev proposed the double zero, he tried to press the US into accepting a third zero, which would have eliminated all nuclear weapons in Europe The US and NATO did not favor a nuclear-free Europe as long as the Warsaw Pact holds a large advantage in conventional forces (18:21).

However, in early 1989, West Germany was urging President Bush to negotiate on SNF. Chancellor Kohl was receiving much pressure from his country, based mainly on the perception that the USSR is not really a threat any more, so nuclear weapons in Germany are not necessary. The US and Britain actually wanted to upgrade this capability, especially the aging Lance missile, which has a range of 75 miles. The US refused to open SNF discussions, and fears of a major rift in NATO again began to rise (65:25, 53:37).

The NATO leaders held a summit in May 1989 to discuss the problem of SNF and the conventional balance. They agreed that any upgrades would be deferred. During the deferral period, the US would continue to negotiate with the USSR on conventional forces. If a suitable agreement was reached, then the US would open discussions on possible SNF reductions (108:27).

Conventional Forces.

Discussions are in fact ongoing on conventional forces. In December 1988, Gorbachev announced he would unilaterally cut the Soviet armed forces by ten per cent, or about 500,000 troops. Of that number, 50,000 are stationed in Europe. He would also remove 5000 tanks from Europe in conjunction with the troop reductions. While western leaders welcomed the move, they still believe further disproportionate cuts are necessary to achieve a "balanced" Europe (109:17,19).

President Bush received praise at the May 1090 summit for his first proposal on conventional forces. He has proposed that both sides reduce troop strength in Europe to 325,000 a piece. This would represent a US cut of 50,000 troops and a Soviet cut of 325,000. While no definitive agreement has been reached, the initial Soviet was positive (108:26). This offer is still on the table, and this set of talks could be the most interesting to watch over the next year, as Europeans are interested in lowering the amount of troops on their soil.

All of these areas are subject to change, of course, and should be watched closely. The climate between the superpowers has definitely warmed up, in part because of the way in which they were able to negotiate and agree on the treaty to eliminate medium range missiles from the world. A May 1989 New York Times/CBS poll found that only 26 per cent of those polled felt that the Soviets posed an immediate military threat to the US (83:16). In a recent speech, President Bush said he would "seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations" (83:17). In these days of ever closer relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seems that anything is possible. The Cold War, for the time being, is over.

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This study performs detailed analysis of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations and treaty and compares them with those of the two Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The study's objectives were: describe SALT and INF negotiations and the contents of the treaties; analyze US and Soviet goals and strategies during the INF negotiations; determine which goals were or were not attained by both sides, and ascertain reasons for this; and delineate arms control progress and prospects since INF Treaty ratification.

The study found that the two SALT treaties did impose ceilings in certain areas of strategic weapons but did not curtail the arms race. Treaty verification methods were criticized as being lax.

The INF Treaty eliminates both countries' medium range missiles, a total of over 2600 missiles. Redeployment is forbidden forever. For the first time, on-site inspections of missile bases and related facilities will occur to ensure compliance.

The US achieved the major goal of ridding Europe of the Soviet SS-20 missile. It had to deploy missiles of its own to make the USSR realize the seriousness of its resolve. The US had total support from NATO in achieving this goal. However, with INF gone, the European conventional forces imbalance looms larger, and the West is fighting to obtain asymmetric conventional cuts. The Soviets achieved their goal of ridding Europe of US missiles. However, it paid the price of destroying all its medium range missiles, something it never originally planned to do. Mikhail Gorbachev made this sacrifice to promote needed peace with the West. His priority of internal reform means he needs to be able to divert resources form defense.

Other areas of arms control are in transition. Further study of arms control could focus on strategic forces, short range nuclear forces or conventional forces negotiations.

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